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Where Did the Productivity 
Growth Go? Inﬂation Dynamics 
and the Distribution of Income
It’s no secret that the gap between the rich and the poor has been growing, but
the extent to which the richest are leaving everybody else behind is not widely
known....   It’s like chasing a speedboat with a rowboat.
—Bob Herbert, The New York Times1
There is no question that a huge gap has opened up between productivity and
living standards....  Not since World War II have productivity and income
diverged so sharply.
—Louis Uchitelle, The New York Times2
THE FIRST HALF of this decade has witnessed a sharp contrast between
strong output and productivity growth, on the one hand, and slow employ-
ment and median income growth, on the other. The strong growth in output
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1. “The Mobility Myth,” The New York Times, June 6, 2005, p. A23.
2. “Were the Good Old Days That Good?” The New York Times, July 3, 2005, p. C1.in labor productivity growth, implying an underlying trend that is rising
faster than in any previous subperiod of the postwar era. Yet who received
the beneﬁts? Median household income actually fell by 3.8 percent from
1999 to 2004 and grew from 1995 to 2004 at a rate of only 0.9 percent a
year, a much slower rate than that of nonfarm private business (NFPB)
output per hour over the same period, at 2.9 percent.
3 Similarly, the
median real wage for all workers grew over 1995–2003 at an average rate
of 1.4 percent a year, less than half the rate of productivity growth.
4
The failure of the productivity growth revival to boost the real incomes
and wages of the median family and the median worker calls into question
the standard economic paradigm that productivity growth translates auto-
matically into rising living standards, as in this quote from Paul Krugman:
Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A coun-
try’s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely
on its ability to raise its output per worker . . . the essential arithmetic says that
long-term growth in living standards . . . depends almost entirely on productivity
growth.
5
This paper should be read in the spirit of a detective novel, whose title
might be “The Case of the Missing Productivity Payoff.” Our detective
story is divided into two parts, macro and micro. The macro part begins
with the standard identity stating that productivity growth equals real wage
growth if labor’s income share is constant. We examine the aggregate data
that compare productivity growth with growth in alternative real wage
measures, and we then ask how the post-1995 acceleration in productivity
growth enters into the econometrics of price and wage dynamics. In past
incarnations of dynamic Phillips curves, productivity growth has been a
sideshow to the main story, if mentioned at all. The paper provides a new
look at price and wage dynamics in order to assess the causes of low inﬂa-
tion in the decade after 1995. In light of the strong demand of the late
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3. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, table 1.1, p. 42). Median household income
updated from 2003 to 2004 is from David Leonhardt, “U.S. Poverty Rate Was Up Last
Year,” The New York Times, August 31, 2005, p. A1.
4. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, table 2.6, p. 122). Measures of real income
and real wages from this source deﬂate nominal values by the CPI-U-RS back to 1978. (The
CPI-U-RS is a supplementary, research version of the CPI-U, which revises the CPI-U back
to 1978 to incorporate improvements in measurement methodology since then.)
5. Krugman (1990, p. 9).1990s, why was inﬂation so low? What role did the revival of trend produc-
tivity growth play, in contrast to other beneﬁcial supply shocks? Did the pro-
ductivity growth slowdown of 1965–79 play a parallel role in creating high
inﬂation in the 1970s? Can dynamic wage and price equations reproduce
the behavior of the changes in labor’s income share observed in the data?
The investigation begins with the Gordon inﬂation model that explains
price changes by inertia, demand shocks, and supply shocks but does
not include wages. A unique contribution of this paper is then to bring
wages back into the study of inflation dynamics and to develop a model
that includes both price and wage equations and allows each to feed
back to the other. This model can capture the effect of changes in trend
productivity growth on inflation, nominal wage changes, and changes in
labor’s income share. In dynamic simulations of the wage-price model,
we find that changes in the productivity growth trend had major effects
in boosting inflation during 1965–79 and in slowing it down between
1995 and 2005.
The second, micro part of the paper then examines the behavior of labor
and nonlabor income as recorded in the micro data ﬁles of the Statistics of
Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) covering 1966–2001.
The IRS micro ﬁles can be used to determine how much of the real income
gain over various periods—for example, 1966–2001 or 1997–2001—accrued
to taxpayers at the median income and to taxpayers at different percentiles
of the income distribution from the 10th to the 99.99th. The IRS data have
the great advantage over the more frequently used Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) data that they allow a microscopic view of what is going on inside
the upper tenth of the income distribution. We ﬁnd that increasing inequal-
ity within the upper tenth is as important a source of growing inequality as
the higher ratio of incomes in the top decile to those in the bottom decile.
Our review of the sources of increased income inequality finds that
economists have placed too much emphasis on skill-biased technical
change and too little on independent factors that have pushed down rela-
tive incomes at the bottom and raised them at the top. At the bottom we
take a broader perspective that extends back to the 1920s, allowing us to
explain the U-shaped time pattern of inequality by three U-shaped factors:
the rise and fall of labor unions, the fall and rise of immigration, and the
fall and rise of international trade. At the top we focus on the enormous
increase in the income share of the top 1 percent and even the top 0.01
percent. Part of our analysis applies the “economics of superstars,” extending
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 69Sherwin Rosen’s original argument that new technology such as CDs, the
Internet, and cable TV boosts the earnings premia of the very top perform-
ers in certain fields.
6 The other part examines the large share of added
income in the upper tail of the income distribution attributable to CEOs
and other top corporate ofﬁcers, where the facts are clear but the interpre-
tations are controversial.
Taken together, the macro and micro parts of our detective story allow
us to allocate across the income distribution the cumulative increase in real
GDP attributable to the post-1995 acceleration in productivity growth. The
macro analysis allows us to determine how much of the cumulative
increase was broadly allocated to all income groups through lower inﬂa-
tion, how much went to nominal labor income, and how much went to
nominal nonlabor income. The micro analysis allows us to look within the
increase in real labor income to determine how much went to the top, mid-
dle, and bottom of the income distribution. In the end we find that only
the top 10 percent of taxpayers had gains in real labor income per hour
that kept pace with productivity growth over either the 1966–2001 or the
1997–2001 period. The micro analysis thus reconciles the paradox that
median income has lagged so far behind productivity growth while labor’s
income share remained roughly constant, by showing that the distribu-
tional change caused median income growth to behave very differently
from mean income growth.
Issues Raised by the Macro Data on Productivity and Labor’s
Share of Income
We begin by examining data on the interplay between productivity
growth and labor’s share of income, exploiting the fact that, by deﬁnition,
a constant income share of labor compensation implies that labor produc-
tivity is growing at the same percentage rate as real labor compensation per
hour. How large was the post-1995 acceleration in productivity growth?
Did real wages respond by accelerating in equal measure, leaving labor’s
income share intact, or did labor’s share decline? If so, how large was the
difference across alternative measures of real wage growth?
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6. Rosen (1981).We begin with a close look at the four years ending in 2005:1. Labor
productivity in the NFPB sector over these four years, according to the
ofﬁcial data as of July 2005, registered a growth rate of 3.89 percent a year.
In contrast, average real hourly earnings in the total private economy
increased at an annual rate of only 0.49 percent. We will show that most
of this large difference can be ascribed to data and definitional issues
and that the decline in labor’s income share due to the remaining differ-
ence did not offset an increase in that share during 1997–2001: labor’s
share was about the same in 2005:1 as eight years earlier. Over a longer
period going back to 1954, labor’s income share has been virtually con-
stant. These data issues include the following: data revisions, the contrast
between actual and trend productivity growth, differences between the
NFPB sector and the total economy, the difference between productivity
growth and real compensation growth, the difference between hourly com-
pensation and average hourly earnings, and the impact of alternative price
deﬂators used to convert nominal wages to real wages.
Data Revisions
The annual revisions of the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) in late July 2005 reduced the reported growth rate of real GDP
over the last few years and raised the reported rate of inﬂation. The com-
plementary revisions to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) productivity
data reduced the annual growth rate of NFPB productivity over the recent
four-year interval from 3.89 percent a year to 3.57 percent a year.
Actual versus Trend
The top panel of figure 1 depicts both actual and trend productivity
growth during 1950–2005. Actual productivity growth is measured as the
eight-quarter rate of change in NFPB output per hour, and trend growth as
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) smoothed trend.
7 Before the recent data revisions,
the HP trend reached 3.5 percent a year during 2003–04, but with the
revisions it barely scrapes 3.0 percent, considerably less than actual pro-
ductivity growth during 2001–05.
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 71
7. The smoothing parameter used for the HP filter is 6400 and was chosen in Gordon
(2003, pp. 220–21) to avoid too much “bending” of the trend in response to the deep reces-
sion of 1981–82.Total Economy versus NFPB
The bottom panel of figure 1 again shows the HP-smoothed trend for
the NFPB sector, this time juxtaposed against the similarly calculated
trend for the entire economy. The latter tracks the NFPB trend quite
closely until the late 1980s and then grows more slowly. It rises above
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; unpublished hours data provided by Phyllis Otto, Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ 
calculations.
Figure 1. Actual and Trend Changes in Output per Hour, NFPB Sector and Total
Economy, Annual Growth Rates, 1950–20052.0 percent in late 1998, two years after the NFPB trend, and it barely
reaches 2.5 percent during 2002. This panel also displays the difference
between the two trends, which is very close to zero on average during
1950–85 but then begins to rise, reaching a maximum of 0.60 percent in
mid-2002. Understanding this difference is important both in relation to
the behavior of labor’s share in the total economy and because future
potential output growth depends on productivity growth in the total econ-
omy, not just that for the NFPB sector.
Productivity, Real Compensation, and Labor’s Income Share
The lower line in the top panel of ﬁgure 2 displays the ratio of NIPA
employee compensation in the total economy to NIPA net national factor
income, that is, GNP minus consumption of ﬁxed capital minus indirect
business taxes. Contrary to the widespread impression that labor’s share
has been squeezed, there was no change in labor’s share from 1997:3 to
2005:1: a substantial increase in the boom of the late 1990s was followed
by a reversal in the early 2000s. Over a longer period, labor’s share has
ﬂuctuated over a wider range. Two sharp increases occurred, the ﬁrst in
1952–54 and a larger one in 1966–70. There were substantial ﬂuctuations
in labor’s income share before 1984, but little movement has been seen
since then.
The upper line in the same panel adds to NIPA employee compensation
the labor component of proprietors’ income, as estimated by the Economic
Policy Institute.
8 Because the share of proprietors’ income in total domes-
tic income has declined over the years, and because the labor share of
that income has also declined, this measure of labor’s income share looks
more stable. Over the entire interval, labor’s share excluding proprietors’
income rises from 65.1 percent in 1950:1 to 69.5 percent in 2005:1, while
the share including proprietors’ income barely rises at all, from 71.8 per-
cent to 72.5 percent. Overall there seems to be little air of crisis in the data
on labor’s share. Especially when the labor component of proprietors’
income is included, the share of labor in domestic income has ﬂoated up
and down over the decades with no clear trend.
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8. See Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, table 1.24, p. 95). The fraction of total
proprietors’ income that we use from this table is linearly interpolated between the selected
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Sources: National Income and Product Accounts, Economic Policy Institute, and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2. Labor and Nonlabor Income Shares, 1950–2005Components of Nonlabor Compensation
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 2 displays the components of the nonlabor
share of domestic income, which by deﬁnition is unity minus the labor’s
share concept plotted as the lower line in the top panel.9 From bottom to
top (and most stable to least stable), the ﬁve components are government
enterprises and transfer payments, income from rent, proprietors’ income,
interest, and corporate proﬁts. The sum of rent and proprietors’ income
declined from 20.1 percent of income in 1950:1 to a low of 8.0 percent in
1983:3 and then gradually increased to reach 11.1 percent in 2005:1. What
emerged to take its place was a huge increase in the share of interest
income, which rose slowly during 1960–80 and then surged from 1980 to
1985. The share of interest income was a mere 1.4 percent in 1950:1,
increased gradually to 6.5 percent in 1979:1, then sharply to 10.9 percent
in 1986:2, and ﬁnally began a slow slide to 7.2 percent in 2005:1. Presum-
ably the increase from 1950 to 1986 is due to the gradual increase in the
use of debt in the economy, multiplied by the sharp increase in nominal
interest rates in the late 1960s, and especially between 1978 and 1981.
Much of the current discussion of the failure of productivity gains to
spill over to labor income focuses on the buoyant behavior of corporate
proﬁts in the past several years. However, the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2
shows that the share of before-tax corporate proﬁts in nonlabor income
has actually declined over time. Examining the ups and downs of the proﬁt
share over successive business cycles reveals that the cyclical low point
fell from 13.1 percent in 1950:1 to 6.9 percent in 2001:3, and the cyclical
high point fell from 15.4 percent in 1950:4 to 11.4 percent in 2005:1.
10
After declining over the earlier part of the postwar era, the profit share
has stabilized over the past two decades and was not unusually high in
2001–05.
The top panel of table 1 reports growth rates of output per hour for the
total economy, for the private business sector (farm and nonfarm, or
NFPB) sector, and for the residual sector, that is, government, households,
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9. In the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2 all of proprietors’ income is included in nonlabor
income. 
10. The cyclical peak of the proﬁt share in 1997:3 (11.6 percent) was almost identical


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































76and institutions. The ﬁrst six columns show average annual growth rates
between benchmark quarters,
11 the next column shows the average growth
rate over the entire 1954–2005 interval, and the ﬁnal two columns break
the 1997–2005 period at 2001:1, in order to focus on differences between
the 1997–2001 period, when the economy was enjoying its extraordinary
expansion, and 2001–05, when the economy was in recession or recover-
ing from recession. Comparison of 1954–87 with 1987–2005 shows that
farm productivity growth slowed from 5.12 percent to 3.64 percent a year,
and growth in the residual sector slowed from 0.90 percent to 0.17 percent
a year, while NFPB productivity growth increased from 1.98 percent to
2.24 percent a year. These shifts in growth rates after 1987 account for the
growing gap between the total economy and the NFPB sector in the bottom
panel of ﬁgure 1.
The middle panel of table 1 reports the growth rate of real compensa-
tion per hour for the total economy, private business, and the residual
sector, deflated by the NIPA deflator for each sector (not the GDP or the
PCE deflator). Using sectoral deflators is appropriate for calculating
labor’s share in each sector from that sector’s productivity. Over the
entire period 1954–2005, differences between real wage growth and pro-
ductivity growth in the total economy were minimal, with average growth
of real compensation of 2.12 percent a year compared with 1.92 percent a
year for productivity, implying a slight increase in labor’s share of 0.20
percentage point a year over the ﬁfty-one years. Somewhat surprisingly,
in light of the frequently heard comment that labor “lost out” from the
productivity growth upsurge, labor’s share in the total economy actually
increased at the same annual rate of 0.20 percent over 1997–2005. In the
private business sector, although there have been differences in the
growth rate of labor’s share over shorter intervals, the broad sweep of
postwar history exhibits a growth in labor’s share during 1954–72, nega-
tive growth between 1972 and 1997, and then positive growth again in
1997–2005.
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11. Benchmark quarters are those when the actual unemployment rate is roughly equal
to the NAIRU and is declining through the NAIRU. Benchmark quarters in table 1 for the
period up through 1987 are the same as or within one quarter of those used in Gordon
(2003). Reflecting lower estimates of the NAIRU displayed in figure 5 below, the mid-
1990s benchmark has been shifted from 1994:4 to 1997:4. The final benchmark quarter is
2005:1, the end of the data examined in table 1.Alternative Wage Indexes and the Role of Price Deﬂators
Table 1 compared productivity growth with labor income growth mea-
sured by only a single real wage index, compensation per hour deﬂated by
the sectoral deﬂators. Table 2 makes the comparison for a wider variety of
real wage indexes. Compared ﬁrst are three real wage indexes that use the
private business deﬂator, of which the ﬁrst is real compensation per hour in
the private business economy, the same as in the middle panel of table 1.
Next is the employment cost index (ECI), which is a CPI-like index of a
market basket of wages that controls for shifts in mix across industries
and occupations, both of which plague the hourly compensation mea-
sure.
12 Third is the BLS index of average hourly earnings (AHE) for pro-
duction and nonsupervisory workers. Because the real AHE growth rate is
often deﬂated by the CPI in ofﬁcial government publications, we include,
in the bottom two rows of table 2, the differences in growth rates between
price indexes that allow us to translate different systems of deﬂation for
the alternative wage indexes.
13
The growth rate of real compensation per hour is above the growth rate
of private sector business productivity both over the entire 1954–2005
period and over the shorter 1997–2005 period. In contrast, for the 1954–
2005 interval AHE grew more slowly than private sector business produc-
tivity by 1.13 percent. When deflated by the CPI-U, the shortfall of real
AHE is −1.83 percent a year (that is, AHE using the business deflator of
1.15 percent a year minus the difference between the CPI and the busi-
ness deflator of 0.70 percentage point in the bottom two lines of the
table minus the productivity growth rate of 2.28 percent a year in the top
line of the table).
Shifting the time interval to 1979–2005 allows the ECI to be brought
into the comparison, in the far right column of the table. For this interval,
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12. Because the ECI is available only back to 1978, several blank cells appear in table 2,
but we are able to track the growth rate of the ECI measure of the real wage over our sub-
intervals starting in 1979.
13. The AHE is deﬂated by the CPI in the Economic Report of the President 2005, table
B-47. There are many reasons for differences in the growth rates of the PCE deﬂator and
the CPI-U. Because of its use in indexed contracts, the CPI-U is never revised, whereas the
PCE deflator is repeatedly revised to reflect improvements in methodology, which have
tended to reduce the inflation rate over such periods as 1978–2000. In addition, the PCE
deﬂator and the CPI-U incorporate different treatments of particular types of consumption,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































79private sector compensation per hour is exactly equal to private business
sector productivity growth, while the shortfall for the ECI deﬂated by the
private business deﬂator is −0.58 percent, that for the ECI deﬂated by the
PCE deﬂator is −1.13 percent, and that for the ECI deﬂated by the CPI-U
is −1.55 percent.
What accounts for these discrepancies? Katherine Abraham, James
Speltzer, and Jay Stewart examined the discrepancy between AHE and a
series very similar to compensation per hour and found that much of the
difference was explained by the fact that AHE covers only production
and nonsupervisory workers. Apparently workers not covered by AHE
are seeing much faster wage growth than covered workers. The differ-
ence between growth in real compensation per hour and AHE is one
aspect of the distinction between median and mean income growth that is
an overriding theme of this paper.
The Effect of Changes in the Productivity Trend in a Model of
Inﬂation Dynamics
We saw in the previous section that labor’s income share has remained
roughly stable over most of the postwar period, and in particular was not
signiﬁcantly lower in early 2005 than in the early stages of the productiv-
ity revival in mid-1997. This stability in labor’s share implies that the post-
1995 increase in trend productivity growth exhibited in ﬁgure 1 must have
created some combination of slower inﬂation and faster nominal wage
growth. This section provides a new analysis of the effects of productivity
growth on the inﬂation rate, using and extending the longstanding model
of inflation dynamics developed by Gordon in the late 1970s and last
reported upon at a Brookings Panel conference seven years ago.
14 Did the
increase in trend productivity growth in 1995–2005 reduce inﬂation, thus
easing the job of the Federal Reserve? And did the decrease in trend pro-
ductivity growth in 1965–79 raise the inﬂation rate and thus complicate the
Federal Reserve’s job in an economy already buffeted by oil and import
price shocks and by the destabilizing effects of the Nixon price controls?
This section begins by presenting the background and speciﬁcation of the
dynamic inﬂation model, including the role of changes in the productivity
80 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
14. Gordon (1998).growth trend, and then discusses several closely related issues in the litera-
ture on inﬂation dynamics that have arisen recently, including more parsi-
monious speciﬁcations and shifts in parameters, the slope of the Phillips
curve itself among them.
15
The Gordon Model of Inﬂation and the Role of Demand 
and Supply Shocks
The inﬂation equation used in this paper is similar in most details to the
speciﬁcation developed by Gordon twenty-ﬁve years ago.16 It builds on
earlier work that combined the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis
with the role of supply shocks as a source of direct shifts in the inﬂation
rate.
17 These supply shocks can create macroeconomic externalities in a
world of nominal wage rigidity. Since the mid-1990s this research has
built on the work of Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and Mark Watson by
incorporating time variation in the natural rate of unemployment, result-
ing in a time-varying non-accelerating-inﬂation rate of unemployment, or
TV-NAIRU.
18 The model is based on a Phillips curve that has three dis-
tinguishing characteristics: the role of inertia is broadly interpreted to go
beyond any speciﬁc formulation of expectations formation to include other
sources of inertia, for example in wage and price contracts; the driving
force from the demand side is an unemployment or output gap; and supply-
shock variables appear explicitly in the inﬂation equation. The speciﬁca-
tion can be written in this general form:
where lowercase letters designate ﬁrst differences of logarithms, capital
letters designate logarithms of levels, and L is a polynomial in the lag
operator.
The dependent variable pt is the inﬂation rate. Inertia is conveyed by a
series of lags on the inﬂation rate (pt−1). Dt is an index of excess demand
(normalized so that Dt = 0 indicates the absence of excess demand), zt is a
() , 1 1 pa L p b L Dc L ze tt t t t = ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + −
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15. See Galí and Gertler (1999), Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001), and Stock
and Watson (2002, 2003) for simplified new Keynesian Phillips curves. For a discussion
of changing parameters see Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Tetlow and Ironside (2005).
16. Gordon (1982); Gordon and King (1982).
17. Gordon (1975, 1977).
18. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997, 2001).vector of supply-shock variables (normalized so that zt = 0 indicates an
absence of supply shocks), and et is a serially uncorrelated error term. Dis-
tinguishing features in the implementation of this model include unusually
long lags on the dependent variable, and a set of supply-shock variables
that are uniformly defined so that a zero value indicates no upward or
downward pressure on inflation.
If the sum of the coefﬁcients on the lagged inﬂation values equals unity,
then there is a “natural rate” of the demand variable (D
N
t ) consistent with a
constant rate of inﬂation.
19 The estimation of the TV-NAIRU combines the
above inﬂation equation, with the unemployment gap serving as the proxy
for excess demand, with a second equation that explicitly allows the
NAIRU to vary with time:
In this formulation the disturbance term νt in the second equation is seri-
ally uncorrelated and is uncorrelated with et. When this standard deviation
σ=0, then the natural rate is constant, and when σ is positive, the model
allows the NAIRU to vary by a limited amount each quarter. If no limit
were placed on the ability of the NAIRU to vary each period, the TV-
NAIRU would jump up and down and soak up all the residual variation in
the inﬂation equation 2.
The reduced-form inﬂation equation 2 includes the gap between the
actual unemployment rate and the NAIRU, as well as the lagged dependent
(inﬂation) variable. In addition, ﬁve variables are included that are inter-
preted as supply shocks (the zt variables in equations 1 and 2), namely, the
change in the relative price of nonfood non-oil imports, the change in the
relative price of food and energy, changes in the relative price of medical
care, the change in the trend rate of productivity growth, and dummy vari-
ables for the effect of the 1971–74 Nixon-era price controls.
20 Lag lengths
() , , v a r . 30 1




tt t =+ () = () = − νν ν σ
() 2 1 pa L p b L UU c L ze tt t t
N
tt = ( ) + ( ) − ( ) + ( ) + −
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19. Although the estimated sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged inﬂation is usually roughly
equal to unity, that sum must be constrained to be exactly unity for a meaningful “natural
rate” of the demand variable to be calculated.
20. The relative import price variable is deﬁned as the rate of change of the nonfood,
non-oil import deﬂator minus the rate of change of the dependent variable. The relative food
and energy variable is defined as the difference between the rates of change of the overall
PCE deflator and the “core” PCE deflator. The Nixon control variables remain the same as are unchanged from those originally speciﬁed by Gordon in 1982,21 so as
to allow an assessment of the robustness of this approach to twenty-ﬁve
years of new data.
Besides the addition of the medical care variable, the other major
change in the current inﬂation equation from the 1998 “Goldilocks” speci-
ﬁcation involves productivity growth, the point of departure for the current
paper. Here we use the HP ﬁlter as in ﬁgure 1 to deﬁne the productivity
trend and then deﬁne the acceleration or deceleration in that trend as the
two-year (eight-quarter) change in the growth rate of the trend, as plotted
in ﬁgure 3. Its deceleration into negative territory from 1965 to 1980 might
be as important a cause of the accelerating inﬂation of that period as its
post-1995 acceleration was as a cause of the low inﬂation of the late 1990s.
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originally speciﬁed in Gordon (1982). Lag lengths remain as in 1982 and are shown explic-
itly in table 3. The medical care variable is deﬁned as the difference between the inﬂation
rate of the PCE deﬂator and the inﬂation rate for that deﬂator when medical care spending is
deducted from total PCE. The productivity variable is the two-year change in the Hodrick-
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Percent
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics data and authors’ calculations.
a. Eight-quarter change in Hodrick-Prescott productivity growth trend using a smoothing parameter of 6400.
Figure 3. Trend Acceleration in Nonfarm Private Business Productivity, 1950–2005
aCoefﬁcients in Alternative Inﬂation Equations
Table 3 displays regression coefﬁcients (or sums of coefﬁcients), sig-
niﬁcance levels, and simulation results for our basic inﬂation equation
and two other variants estimated over 1962:1 to 2005:2. The ﬁrst data col-
umn reports results for what we call the “naïve” Phillips curve equation,
which contains only the current level of the unemployment rate and four
lags of the dependent variable. This equation ﬁts the data poorly: the sum
of squared residuals is 177.
The second column reports results of the 1998 “Goldilocks” version of
the full speciﬁcation in equation 2. Included are twenty-four lags on the
dependent variable, the unemployment gap relative to the TV-NAIRU that
is estimated simultaneously, and the supply-shock variables.
22 Compared
with the first column, the full version in this column cuts the sum of
squared residuals by almost two-thirds, from 177 to 63.
The third column reports results of our preferred speciﬁcation, which
incorporates both the productivity acceleration and the medical care effect
and omits the deviation of productivity growth from trend. This version
has better summary statistics, all of the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant, and the
simulation errors show that the equation has little drift over time and has
very small mean squared error. The productivity acceleration enters with
its ﬁrst and ﬁfth lags, and these coefﬁcients sum to −1.34, indicating that
an acceleration in the productivity trend reduces inﬂation by more than
one for one. Unlike in the Goldilocks speciﬁcation, which uses the devia-
tion of actual productivity growth from trend, this variable is highly signif-
icant and shows that changes in the productivity trend have a major impact
on inﬂation.
23
Figure 3 gives an idea of the scale of this impact. The acceleration in
the productivity trend hit its peak of 0.46 in 1999, and the effect of the
variable near the peak of the last business cycle, between 1998 and 2000,
would have been to lower inflation by about a half percentage point.
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22. In addition to omitting the medical care effect, the Goldilocks version in this column
uses the original Gordon (1982) treatment of productivity, that is, the deviation of actual
productivity growth from its trend growth rate.
23. The sum of the coefﬁcients on the two productivity acceleration terms is highly sig-
niﬁcant, with a t statistic of −4.07. The two individual coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant, indi-
cating that they convey the same information. Nevertheless, we include both rather than one















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































85Symmetrically, the deceleration in the trend hit a local minimum of −0.40
in 1978, and this added to the acceleration of inﬂation in the 1970s by
about half a percentage point. As table 5 will show, these static results
greatly  underestimate the full impact of the 1995–2005 productivity
growth acceleration and the 1965–78 deceleration, because they ignore
dynamic feedback through the lagged dependent variable.
The Inﬂation Equation: Simulation Performance
Although most papers presenting time-series regression results display
regression coefﬁcients, signiﬁcance levels, and summary statistics, few go
beyond that to display the results of dynamic simulations. Yet the perfor-
mance of the inflation equation is driven in large part by the role of the
lagged dependent variable, making dynamic simulations the preferable
method for testing. To run such simulations, we truncate the sample period
ten years before the end of the data interval in 2005:2, and we use the esti-
mated coefficients through 1995:2 to simulate the performance of the
equation for those ten years, generating the lagged dependent variables
endogenously.
Since the simulation has no information on the actual value of the
inflation rate and no error correction mechanism, there is nothing to keep
the simulated inflation rate from drifting far away from the actual rate.
24
The bottom two rows of table 3 summarize the simulation results in two
statistics, the mean error over the forty-quarter simulation period and the
root mean squared error. The mean error reflects the drift of the simu-
lated value away from the actual value, so that the naïve Phillips curve
on average over 1995–2005 has a predicted value of inflation that on
average is fully 4.0 percentage points higher than the actual outcome.
The 1998 Goldilocks specification has a much smaller mean error of 
−0.64 percentage point, still a substantial overprediction of inflation.
25 In
contrast, our preferred speciﬁcation has a minuscule mean error of −0.11.
The root mean squared error of the preferred specification of 0.56 is
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24. A qualiﬁcation is that the TV-NAIRU used to calculate the unemployment gap after
1995 is based on data for the full period 1962–2005. This makes little difference, since the
TV-NAIRU is almost constant during the 1995–2005 interval.
25. The simulation errors shown in the second column are calculated with the 1998
speciﬁcation run on today’s data through 2005. The simulation mean error reported in the
1998 paper (table 3, p. 315) was −0.46, but that was for a simulation period of only twenty-
two quarters whereas this paper covers a more demanding forty quarters.actually substantially lower than the within-sample standard error of the
estimate of 0.65.
Figure 4 displays vividly the differences among these simulation results
in their ability to track the four-quarter change in the actual PCE inﬂation
rate. Within-sample predicted values are plotted to the left of the vertical
line, and the post-sample simulated values to the right. The naïve speciﬁ-
cation has no clue as to why inﬂation was so low in the late 1990s, and its
simulated inﬂation rate soars to close to 9 percent by 2005. The Goldilocks
speciﬁcation drifts above the actual outcome, but by 2005 it is still only
half a percentage point too high. The preferred speciﬁcation hugs the actual
values with amazing tightness.
The excellent simulation performance of the preferred specification
has two important implications. First, inflation is more than simply a ran-
dom walk. The supply-shock variables and the unemployment gap add a
substantial amount of information beyond that from the lagged depen-
dent variable. Second, the absence of drift in the simulations shows that
the equation is stable after 1995.
Indeed, the price equation is stable not only after 1995, but across the
full sample as well. A Chow test for a break at 1983:4 cannot reject the null
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics data, authors’ calculations.
a. Simulations are generated using the models reported in table 3.
Figure 4. Four-Quarter Changes in Actual, Predicted, and Simulated Values of the
PCE Deﬂator, 1984–2005
aof no break.26 Furthermore, when interaction terms are added allowing any
of the coefﬁcients to change, none of the sums of interaction terms is sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero, except for the food and energy effect.
Andrew Atkeson and Lee Ohanian have claimed that the classic Phillips
relationship between inﬂation and unemployment no longer holds.
27 Their
conclusion, however, is entirely dependent on using a random walk to pre-
dict inﬂation. The signiﬁcance of our coefﬁcients, the performance of our
simulations, and the stability of our model over time are at odds with their
claim of instability and a structural shift in the Phillips curve. In our pre-
ferred speciﬁcation the estimated change in the Phillips curve slope is not
even remotely signiﬁcant.
Estimating the TV-NAIRU
The TV-NAIRU is estimated in equation 3 simultaneously with the
inﬂation equation 2. In the estimation process, the coefﬁcients are forced to
sum to unity. For each set of variables, there is a different TV-NAIRU. For
instance, when supply-shock variables are omitted, the TV-NAIRU soars
to 8 percent in the mid-1970s, since this is the only way the inﬂation equa-
tion can “explain” why inﬂation was so high in that decade. However,
when the inﬂation equation includes the full set of supply shocks, the TV-
NAIRU is quite stable.
As explained above, the NAIRU can be either so smooth as to be a con-
stant, or so jumpy as to explain all the residual variation in the inflation
equation. Rather than estimate the gain ratio for the Kalman smoother,
either through a maximum likelihood estimate or by using the Stock-
Watson median unbiased estimator, we impose a gain ratio of 0.0125.
28
This value was chosen as a compromise that would allow the NAIRU to
vary over time yet also remove all negative serial correlation.
29 The TV-
NAIRU series associated with our basic inﬂation equation for the PCE
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26. The value of the F(27,114) ratio based on estimating separate equations for
1962:1–1983:4 and 1984:1–2005:2 is 1.25, compared with a 5 percent critical F value of 1.55.
27. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). See also Tetlow and Ironside (2005) for an analysis
of changes in the slope used in the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model.
28. See Stock and Watson (1996). Speciﬁcally, we used a Quandt likelihood ratio statis-
tic and drew our estimate of the gain ratio from their table 3.
29. We reject negative serial correlation in the TV-NAIRU, because the basic idea of the
NAIRU is to reﬂect the gradual evolution of frictions in labor and product markets. For a
further discussion of the smoothness issue, see Gordon (1998, pp. 311–12).deﬂator is displayed in ﬁgure 5. It remains within a narrow band between
1962 and 1988 but then drifts downward until it reaches 5 percent in 1995.
Thus we concur with the general consensus that the TV-NAIRU is cur-
rently roughly in the vicinity of 5.0 percent.
30 For historical continuity, ﬁg-
ure 5 also displays the TV-NAIRU that was estimated for the PCE deﬂator
in Gordon’s 1998 paper.
31 Our current speciﬁcation yields a TV-NAIRU
that is about half a percentage point below the 1998 Goldilocks speciﬁca-
tion for most of the sample period, but the 1998 version of the TV-NAIRU
declines more rapidly in the mid-1990s and is virtually the same as our
current version in 1997–98.
Adding the Wage Equation and Closing the Model
It has long been recognized that any factors that affect prices may
also affect wages. This can be supported from a wage aspiration frame-
work, from the basic supply-shock perspective set out above, or from a
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics data, authors’ calculations.
Preferred current 
specification
Figure 5. Time-Varying NAIRU, “Goldilocks” and Current Speciﬁcations, 1962–2005
30. The standard error for the estimate of the NAIRU is 0.92.
31. Gordon (1998, ﬁgure 1, p. 312).purely statistical argument.32 Our baseline wage equation is therefore
estimated with identical explanatory variables as the equation for prices.
We then add a feedback term that allows wages and prices to interact
dynamically.
The dependent variable in the wage equations, rather than simply com-
pensation per hour, is the change in trend unit labor cost (TULC):
This is identical to the inﬂation equation 2 above except that we have
replaced the inﬂation rate (p) with the change in TULC, that is, the change
in nominal compensation per hour (w) minus the change in trend produc-
tivity growth (θ*). One reason for using the change in TULC rather than
actual unit labor cost is that it removes the added variance associated with
highly volatile changes in measured productivity growth. Throughout this
paper we focus on trend productivity growth; it is used as an explanatory
variable in tables 3 and 4 and is subtracted from changes in wages to form
the dependent variable (TULC) of the wage equations.
Closing the Model
How was productivity growth during its post-1995 revival divided
between slower inﬂation and faster growth in nominal compensation per
hour? We start with the deﬁnition of the change in the trend labor share of
income (tls) as the change in the nominal wage rate (w) minus the trend in
productivity growth (θ*) minus the inﬂation rate (p):
How does the change in the trend labor share enter into the price and
wage equations? An important feature of the inﬂation equation 2 is that
wages do not matter for the determination of inﬂation. Similarly, in the
wage equation 4, prices do not matter for the determination of wage
changes. Loosening these restrictions allows us to develop symmetric
price and wage equations with mutual feedback between prices and
wages, which is transmitted by the change in the trend labor share.
() () . 5 tls w p tt t   − ∗ − θ
() ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () 4 1 wd L w f L U U g L z tt tt
N − ∗ =− ∗ +− + − θθ t tt e + .
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32. Sims (1987) argued that equations with wages and prices as alternative dependent
variables are simply alternative “rotations” of each other.We begin by modifying the wage equation 4 to allow changes in TULC
to depend on both lagged TULC changes and lagged inﬂation:
Equation 6 is completely general in allowing any mix of lagged TULC
change and lagged inﬂation to drive the evolution of TULC changes.
Equation 7 is a simple algebraic rearrangement of equation 6 that adds
and subtracts the “h” coefficients multiplied by the change in TULC 
(w −θ *)t. By constraining the sum of the d and h coefﬁcients, the natural
rate hypothesis can be retained. Notice that the transformation brings the
change in the trend labor share into the equation, as the second term mul-
tiplied by h(L) is the same as tlst as deﬁned in equation 5. An identical
transformation can be applied to the price equation that adds the lagged
effect of TULC as a supply-shock term and, after the same transformation,
introduces the change in the trend labor share into the inﬂation equation
33:
Notice that our ﬁnal TULC change and inﬂation equations (equations 7
and 9) are completely symmetric, explaining the dependent variable with
a set of lagged dependent variables, the change in the trend labor share,
the output gap, and supply shocks. The only difference is that the change
in the trend labor share enters with opposite signs: negative in the TULC
equation and positive in the inﬂation equation.
() () () () ( )
() (
9 11 pa Lj L p j L w p
fL
tt t =+ [] +− ∗ −
+
−− θ
U UU g L ze tt
N
tt −+ + )( ) .
() () () ( ) () ( ) 8 11 pa L p j L w b L UU c tt t t t
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33. Equation 7 is identical to equation 8 in Gordon (1998, p. 306). That paper worked
out the role of changes in the trend labor share in transmitting wage impulses and price
impulses back and forth between the inflation and wage change equations, but it did not
develop an adequate empirical implementation of the model.92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
Estimated Coefﬁcients and Simulation Performance
Table 4 displays results from the preferred speciﬁcation (equation 9) of
the inﬂation equation applied in the ﬁrst and fourth columns to two differ-
ent inﬂation measures, the PCE deﬂator and the NFPB deﬂator, respec-
tively. The second and ﬁfth columns then estimate equation 7 for the
change in TULC. The biggest differences between the wage equation and
the inﬂation equation are in the summary statistics, with a much better ﬁt
for the inﬂation equations. Coefﬁcients are somewhat different in the
wage equation from those in the price equations. The reaction of TULC to
the unemployment gap is somewhat smaller than that of prices, and the
reactions to the medical care effect and the relative price of imports are
negative rather than positive, albeit insigniﬁcant.
In table 4 all the inﬂation and TULC equations include the change in
the trend labor share, as required by equations 7 and 9 above, and this
extra term has been entered with the ﬁrst through the eighth lag. In all of
these equations the sum of coefﬁcients on lagged tls is signiﬁcant and has
the correct sign: positive in the inﬂation equations and negative in the
TULC equations. The simulation errors for inﬂation are similar to those in
the model without wage feedback, but those for TULC are noticeably bet-
ter than when the lagged tls terms are excluded.
The coefﬁcients are subtracted in the third and sixth columns of table 4
in order to derive an equation for the change in the trend labor share. An
interesting result in the second row is that, as aggregate demand improves,
as represented by a decline in the unemployment gap, tls is predicted to be
negative as the extra demand boosts prices more than wages. This is noth-
ing more than the famous result of the countercyclical real wage (or neg-
atively sloped labor demand curve) debated in the late 1930s by Keynes
and his critics.
Another important implication of table 4 is that the sum of coefﬁcients
on the lagged tls terms in the seventh row of the last column subtracts to
a value of −0.87, implying that, all else equal, the growth rate of tls will
tend toward zero through an error correction mechanism, eventually
finding an equilibrium. Second, the early (first lag) effect of a productiv-
ity acceleration implies an increase in labor’s share, and the late (fifth
lag) effect corrects this. The long-run effect of changes in productivity
on the acceleration of the labor share is extinguished by the negative











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although the coefﬁcients on the productivity acceleration variable in
table 4 indicate that such an acceleration should cause a shift in the level
of labor’s share, a better way of illustrating exactly how productivity has
inﬂuenced labor’s share is to calculate a dynamic simulation of the price
and wage equations. We will assume ﬁrst that the productivity growth
slowdown of the late 1960s and 1970s never occurred. Then we will
assume that the post-1995 productivity acceleration never occurred.
These counterfactual simulations are calculated by using the coefﬁcients
from the regressions over the full sample to simulate price and wage
changes, ﬁrst with all the variables taking their actual values, and then,
alternatively, with the productivity acceleration terms set to zero. The
simulation that “turns off” the productivity slowdown runs from 1965:1 to
1980:1, and the simulation that “turns off” the productivity revival runs
from 1995:3 to 2005:2. Recall that the 1995–2005 simulation results dif-
fer from those summarized at the bottom of tables 3 and 4, because those
simulations terminated the sample period at 1995:2, whereas these use
coefﬁcients based on the entire 1962–2005 sample period and thus would
be expected to have lower mean errors.
Table 5 summarizes the results of the two simulations. The top panel
shows ﬁve lines of results for the NFPB deﬂator: the actual change, the
simulated change assuming the actual behavior of the productivity growth
trend acceleration variable, the counterfactual simulation that suppresses
the same productivity variable to zero, the simulation error (the ﬁrst line
minus the second), and the counterfactual effect of the change in trend
productivity growth (the second line minus the third). The middle panel
shows the same for the change in TULC, and the bottom panel shows the
same for the change in the trend labor share.
The two left-hand columns of table 5 summarize results for the pro-
ductivity slowdown simulation of 1965–80, and the two right-hand
columns do the same for the productivity revival simulation after 1995.
For each simulation the first of the two columns reports the mean annual
percentage rate of change over the full simulation period, whereas the
second identifies any drift in the simulations by displaying the four-
quarter change in the final year of each simulation.
The fourth line in each panel summarizes our ﬁndings for the simulation
errors in each period. As in the simulation results presented earlier, the
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simulation errors for the NFPB deﬂator are very small, with no drift at all
in the ﬁnal four quarters of the simulation period. For the change in the
TULC (the middle panel), the mean error is again modest but the error in
the ﬁnal year is higher, indicating an overprediction of TULC changes at
the end of the 1965–80 simulation and a substantial underprediction at the
end of the 1995–2005 simulation. The errors for the change in the trend
labor share match those for the change in TULC, since the inﬂation errors
are so low.
The bottom line in each panel of table 5 reports the main results of this
section. The mean effect over the simulation period of the 1965–80 pro-
ductivity growth slowdown was to add 1.28 percentage points to the inﬂa-
tion rate, 1.46 percentage points to TULC growth, and 0.18 percentage
point to the change in the trend labor share. Symmetrically, the mean effect
over the simulation period of the 1995–2005 productivity growth revival
was to subtract 1.19 percentage points from the inﬂation rate, 1.38 percent-
age points from TULC growth, and 0.19 percentage point from the change
in the trend labor share. It appears that a sustained productivity growth
acceleration shifts labor’s share down, and a sustained productivity growth
slowdown shifts labor’s share up, explaining part of the sharp jump in
labor’s share observed in the NIPA data for 1966–71. The second and
fourth columns show that these productivity effects continue to grow, so
that after ﬁfteen years the post-1965 productivity growth slowdown had
caused the inﬂation rate to be 2.68 percentage points higher than it would
have been otherwise, and after ten years the post-1995 productivity growth
revival had held down the annual inﬂation rate by 1.7 percentage points,
with even greater effects on the change in TULC.
Overall, these results go considerably beyond the Phillips curve litera-
ture of the past decade by developing wage equations in parallel with price
equations and allowing mutual feedback between them, using the change
in the trend labor share as the variable by which the feedback is transmit-
ted. We expose the wage-price model to the demanding task of staying on
track in dynamic simulations, and these yield strong responses of both
wage and price changes to decelerations or accelerations in productivity
growth. The trend decline in productivity growth between 1965 and 1978
was a much more important contributor to high inﬂation in the late 1960s
and the entire decade of the 1970s than is generally recognized. And the
trend increase in productivity growth after 1995 was the most important
single element in keeping inﬂation low and allowing the Federal Reserveto set short-term interest rates much lower than would otherwise have been
possible.
Changes in the Distribution of Income
By definition, macro models deal with sums and averages and have
nothing to say about the reasons why the average growth rate of hourly
compensation is different from the median growth rate of hourly compen-
sation. Further, median annual earnings can grow at a different rate than
median hourly earnings if annual hours behave differently for low-paid
and high-paid workers, for example when a recession like that of 1981–82
causes a sharp drop in annual hours for low-paid workers.
To address differences in average and median growth rates of com-
pensation that occur with a shift in the distribution of income, one has to
switch from macro to micro data. This part of the paper reports new
results on changes in the distribution of income from Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) micro data files and compares these changes with those in
the Current Population Survey (CPS), the source used by most of the 
literature in labor economics on issues related to income inequality.
Although the IRS data have numerous disadvantages, discussed below,
they have the unique advantage of allowing a microscopic look at incomes
within the top 10 percent of the income distribution. Whereas the CPS data
are “top-coded,” so that an income of $1 million in a particular year may
be classiﬁed only as “greater than $100,000,” the IRS data provide precise
income data from tax returns for all taxpayers, no matter whether their
income is $100,000, $1 million, or $10 million.
When we compare our IRS data with the CPS data for the main part
of the income distribution using the conventional ratio of income in the
90th percentile to that in the 10th percentile, we obtain results for the
increase in income inequality since the late 1960s that are similar in
both magnitude and timing. But when we go above the 90th percentile
we find significant further increases of inequality that the CPS data
miss. Although most of our analysis focuses on wage and salary income,
in order to highlight the comparison of mean and median growth rates of
labor compensation with the growth rate of productivity, our data also
allow an analysis of changes in the distribution of nonlabor income
(rent, interest, dividends, and business income) and of total (labor plus
nonlabor) income.
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 97Data Issues
For every year between 1966 and 2001 the IRS has released data on
income tax returns from over 100,000 ﬁlers; the average over the sample
period is 130,000. These returns oversample ﬁlers at the very top of the
distribution, so that one can study the distribution at the level of the top
0.1 percent or even the top 0.01 percent of taxpayers.34 Our examination
of these tax returns over the thirty-six-year data period is thus based on
roughly 5 million observations.
Because there are minimum income requirements for ﬁling, the data are
ﬂawed in that they omit income earned by nonﬁlers at the bottom of the
distribution. We follow the method of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel
Saez of counting the total number of tax units in the economy by adding
the total number of married couples and nonmarried adults.
35 Total tax
units and total returns ﬁled are reported in table 6, where we ﬁnd that tax
returns have consistently accounted for over 92 percent of tax units. Given
that those who do not ﬁle necessarily have very little income and account
for only 5 to 10 percent of the population, the IRS micro data allow us to
obtain a very complete record of incomes actually earned. Table 6 also
shows how many tax units reported wage income each year and how many
hours were worked per tax unit on average. We use the hours history to
illustrate general trends in hours worked, and subsequently to compare
growth in IRS real compensation per hour with growth in output per
hour.
36
Income is not always faithfully reported to the IRS. Every year the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes data comparing its esti-
mates of income that should be reported to the IRS with what is actually
reported on tax returns. The gap between the IRS and BEA measures of
adjusted gross income (AGI) ranges between 8.4 and 14.4 percent of the
latter. For wages, because nearly all wage earners file tax returns, and
because their wages are reported by their employers, this gap is never
98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
34. The oversampling is extreme at the very top, where in every year between 1966 and
2001 between 3,000 and 3,500 returns are sampled for the top 0.01 percent, representing
about 40 percent of those returns for 1966 and about 23 percent for 2001.
35. Piketty and Saez (2003); these authors claim that the number of married couples who
ﬁle individually is insigniﬁcant.
36. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) find that many former income earners have
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37. Park (2002, table 3).
38. One is tempted to assume that misreporting is more prevalent among the rich, who
have the means with which to do it legally and the incentive to do it illegally. If this is so,
our estimates of top income shares can be viewed as a lower bound.
39. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005).
40. We appreciate the help of Lawrence Katz of Harvard University in providing these
data on the 90/10 CPS ratios.
greater than 6 percent.
37 We make no adjustments to wages for misreport-
ing but instead simply assume that misreporting is equally distributed
across income levels.
38 Despite the problem of misreporting, our IRS data
have the advantage that most income is solidly linked to W-2, 1098, and
1099 forms, and these data are not subject to the recall bias that plagues
such sample surveys as the CPS.
Changes in the Distribution of Wage Income in IRS and CPS Data
Our research on the income distribution can be viewed as complemen-
tary to that of David Autor, Lawrence Katz, and Melissa Kearney, who
provide an extensive critical survey of the large labor economics literature
on the sources of increased inequality, as well as their own new results
from analysis of the CPS data.
39 The top panel of ﬁgure 6 tracks the log
ratio of income in the 90th to that in the 10th percentile (P90/P10) from
1966 to 2001 in three data sets: the March CPS, the alternative May “Out-
going Rotation Group” (MORG) samples (both from Autor, Katz, and
Kearney), and our IRS data.
40 Both CPS measures compare wages only
for people actually working, whereas our set looks at total income for the
year. People who work only part of the year may report very low wages for
the full year even if their wages when working were much higher, and
these people will have very low wages in the IRS data but relatively higher
wage income in the CPS data. The average IRS annual income at the 10th
percentile was only about $4,000 in 2001; a full-time minimum wage
worker would have earned roughly $10,000 in that year.
The bottom panel of figure 6 again shows the P90/P10 ratio over time,
this time expressed as an index number with the natural log equal to zero
in 1973. The three measures show surprisingly similar changes, although
there are subtle differences. In the IRS series, all of the increase after 1980
has occurred by 1989, whereas the March CPS series increases over a
longer period, rising from zero to 0.15 during 1980–89 and then to 0.27
during 1989–2001. The pattern in the MORG data is almost identical, with
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Sources: Census Bureau, March Supplement; Internal Revenue Service data; authors’ calculations.
Figure 6. Log Ratios of 90th to 10th Labor Income Percentiles in Three Data Sets,
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the two CPS measures continued to increase in the 1990s becomes impor-
tant in distinguishing among the different explanations of increased
inequality, as explored below.
Autor, Katz, and Kearney emphasize the contrast between the behavior
at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution, as represented by
changes in the P50/P10 and P90/P10 ratios. Their results for the CPS data
are qualitatively the same as ours for the IRS data, shown in the top panel of
ﬁgure 7. There was no change in the P50/P10 ratio over the full data inter-
val. If, as this suggests, all of the increase in inequality was occurring above
the 50th percentile, and not in the P50/P10 ratio, the sharp decline in the
real minimum wage in the 1980s, emphasized as a major cause by David
Card and John DiNardo,
41 could not have been important. In contrast to the
stability of the P50/P10 ratio is the increase in the P90/P10 IRS ratio.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 7 uses the IRS data to look within the top 
10 percent of the income distribution; it shows that, whereas the log of the
P90/P10 ratio increased by 0.293 over the 1966–2001 period, the log of the
P99/P10 ratio increased by 0.628, and that of the P99.9/P10 ratio by 1.047.
Taking antilogs to convert these into index numbers, we ﬁnd that inequal-
ity by 2001 was 134, 187, and 285 percent of its 1966 level for each of the
three measures, respectively. Thus the limited focus on the P90/P10 ratio
in the literature based on the CPS data misses the dramatic increase in
inequality within the top 10 percent.
The Distribution of Labor Income in the IRS Data
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the IRS data, starting
with the top panel of table 7, which summarizes the changes in the wage
and salary income shares of the quantiles. Over time the shares of those in
the bottom 90 percent have fallen by a total of 11 percentage points (the
sum of the changes in the ﬁrst four lines of the last column), while those
of the top 10 percent have risen by an equivalent amount. Shown sepa-
rately is the top 0.01 percent of the distribution, whose share increased by
a factor of nine, from 0.2 to 1.8 percent of total wage and salary income.
Although income shares are useful for comparing relative incomes,
knowing the total dollar income accruing to each quantile is more helpful
for analyzing changes in welfare, and particularly for our central topic, the
response of relative real incomes to the post-1995 revival in productivity
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104growth. The bottom panel of table 7 reports the total real wage income
going to each of our selected quantiles and the change in that income
between 1966 and 2001.
42 Of the total increase in real labor income of over
$2.8 trillion, less than 12 percent went to the bottom half of the income dis-
tribution.
43 More of the income change accrued to the top 1 percent than to
the entire lower 50 percent, and more accrued to the top 0.01 percent than
to the entire bottom 20 percent. The small share going to the bottom half
reﬂects not just growing inequality of real hourly wages, but also a smaller
number of hours worked by those at the bottom.
44
Table 7 also shows, in the far right column, how much of the increase
in real compensation between 1997 and 2001 went to each quantile.
Approximately the same amount went to those in the 90th through the
95th percentiles as to those in the 20th through the 50th percentiles, and
about the same amount went to the bottom 80 percent as to the top 5 per-
cent (36.1 percent and 38.2 percent, respectively). The shares of wage
growth in recent years are distributed approximately the same way as
those over the past thirty-six years.
45
The top panel of table 8 shows actual wages and salaries at each
threshold quantile in selected years between 1966 and 2001, as well as
the skewness of the wage distribution in those years. Since skewness is
unaffected by the magnitude of these values, it can be used as a consis-
tent measure of changes in inequality over time. The most notable result
here is that the median real wage has risen by only 11 percent in thirty-
six years, for an average annual growth rate of 0.3 percent. Compare
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 105
42. Every inﬂation-adjusted number in this section is calculated using the PCE deﬂator,
not any version of the CPI.
43. The $2.8 billion estimate for the total increase in real wage income matches nicely
with the change reported by the BEA of $3.1 billion, given the decline in the percentage of
BEA wages reported to the IRS.
44. Gottschalk and Danziger (2005, ﬁgures 8 and 9) show that hours worked per year for
those at or below the 10th percentile are cyclically volatile compared with those at or above
the 90th. Thus much of the upsurge in earnings inequality in the deep recession of 1981–82
is an artifact of annual earnings falling so much relative to hourly wages in the ﬁrst group
but not in the second.
45. A careful reader might note that tax units are not the same as households, and since
there are an average of 1.3 tax units per household, it is possible that the average household
has one tax unit that is earning very little, say, an eighteen-year-old high school senior, and
one tax unit, his or her parents, that is in the upper half of the distribution and has reaped
greater gains. Although this is possible, it cannot apply to most households, since the aver-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.this with average annual productivity growth of 1.57 percent over the
same 1966–2001 period for the entire economy, which is somewhat
slower than the 1.74 percent annual growth rate for the NFPB sector. In
stark contrast, real income in the 99.9th percentile grew at over 3.4 per-
cent a year, and that in the 99.99th percentile grew at over 5.6 percent a
year. Skewness tells the same story, rising from 11 in 1966 to 319 in
2001.
46
Since 1966, NIPA wages and salaries have made up a steadily smaller
portion of NIPA total compensation as fringe beneﬁts have risen. To cor-
rect for this, we apply the decline in the NIPA wage share of compensa-
tion equally to all percentiles. The middle panel of table 8 reports income
at the threshold quantiles, adjusted for the change in the share of wages in
total compensation, which itself is shown in the last column. This raises
the average annual growth rate by the same amount, 0.24 percentage point,
for each percentile group.
Finally, the bottom panel of table 8 shows growth rates of total com-
pensation adjusted for growth in hours worked. In order to compare
growth in total compensation with productivity growth, we need to know
how many hours each tax unit worked. We make no assumptions about the
distribution of the change in hours over time, but simply show what com-
pensation growth would have been had there been no general decline in
hours worked per tax unit. With these adjusted growth rates, we can com-
pare the changes in each quantile with the 1.57 percent annual change in
economy-wide productivity between 1966 and 2001. What the table shows
is that no quantile below the 90th percentile experienced growth in wages
commensurate with the average rate of productivity growth. Even the 80th
percentile, after adjusting their wages upward for fringe benefits and
hours, experienced real hourly compensation growth slower than average
productivity growth.
Even when we look at growth in the income of individual tax units
(examining a separate set of IRS panel data from 1979 to 1990), the
median growth rate, after accounting for changes in hours worked per tax
unit and wages as a share of compensation, rises by only 0.34 percentage
point a year. This compares with a change in median income of −0.38 per-
cent a year and economy-wide productivity growth of 1.41 percent a year
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46. Measured skewness is fairly volatile, since it is heavily inﬂuenced by the top few
observations, which are many orders of magnitude above the mean, but it has unambigu-
ously risen an enormous amount over our sample.108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
for the 1979–90 interval. The panel data cover only a small sample of tax
returns and years, but they show that, even in this alternative source of
income growth that tracks individual taxpayers over time (for example,
students who transition into adult jobs), the median does not keep up with
productivity.
Capital Income
It is well known that capital (that is, nonlabor) income is less equally
distributed than labor income, but did that inequality increase in the
1966–2001 period? The IRS data are ideally suited to answer this question
and allow us to include five general types of nonlabor income: interest,
dividends, rent, business, and pension income. We exclude capital gains
income, because capital gains are excluded from NIPA personal income.
Unlike wages and salaries, these income sources cannot be directly
mapped to the NIPA personal income tables in any useful way, for two
main reasons.
47 One is that some income covered by the IRS, such as small
business income, is not included in the NIPA. The second is that there is a
larger discrepancy between IRS reported income and its NIPA equivalent
for nonlabor income than for wages and salaries (as discussed above).
The data on nonlabor income include many tax filers who declare
losses; we exclude these returns from our data set. Further, average
declared farm income is less than zero, so we completely ignore it as well.
By ignoring these losses, we make the assumption that year-after-year
losses are not economically meaningful but rather reflect opportunities
provided by the tax system for middle- and upper-income people to shelter
income from taxes. These losses do not represent what we mean by
“poverty” and are economically different from the situation of those who
earn only wage income and are in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution.
The top panel of table 9 reports data on total real income for selected
quantiles. As one would expect, the ranking based on total income is
much more concentrated than that for labor income alone, as reported in
table 7. Nearly as much of the change in total real nonlabor income from
1966 to 2001 went to the top 0.1 percent as went to the bottom 50 percent.
47. The BEA does provide comparisons of BEA and IRS-equivalent measures of
income, but the detailed breakdowns are not available for every year, and much of the
reconciliation, especially for nonlabor income, is simply defined as “income not included
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The next two panels decompose income into labor and nonlabor income.
Comparing shares of changes, the data for all three measures of income
are roughly similar for the bottom 80 percent but then diverge sharply for
the top 20 percent. The top 1 and 0.1 percent have far larger shares of the
change in nonlabor income than of the change in wage income. Every
other quantile takes a smaller share of the change in nonlabor income than
of the change in total income.
The bottom panel of table 9 shows, not surprisingly, that as one moves
up the income distribution beyond the 90th percentile, nonlabor income
tends to account for a larger share of total income. Interestingly, however,
nonwage income has worked its way down the income distribution over
time. The top quantiles have taken most of the change in nonlabor income,
but the lower quantiles, especially the 50th through the 80th and the 80th
through the 90th percentiles, have seen a much larger percentage of their
incomes coming from nonlabor income, whereas for the top 5 percent this
proportion has declined. In 1966, 72 percent of the income of the top 
0.1 percent came from nonlabor sources; by 2001 this was only 60 percent.
Meanwhile, for the 50th through the 80th percentiles the share rose from
10 percent to 18 percent, nearly doubling. So there are two conflicting
trends: the majority of additional nonlabor income is going to the top 10
percent of the distribution, but nonlabor income is providing a smaller
share of income at the top, and a larger share in the lower quantiles.
The top and bottom panels of ﬁgure 8 show how the distribution of
gains looks for the top 10 percent and the top 1 percent, respectively. The
top decile tends to take about the same share of added labor and nonlabor
income, but the top percentile takes a much larger share of nonwage gains.
It is striking how different the bars for 1979–97 and 1997–2001 look from
those for 1966–79. The share of the top 10 percent in total (labor and non-
labor) real income gains ranged from 33.6 percent for 1966–79, to a much
higher 59.0 percent for 1979–97, to a somewhat lower 48.6 percent for
1997–2001, averaging out at 49.4 percent for 1966–2001.
Lessons from the IRS Data
Comparison of the P90/P10 and P50/P10 ratios in the IRS data conﬁrms
the basic conclusion of other authors based on CPS data that the increase in
inequality since the late 1960s has been a phenomenon of the top half of
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Source: Internal Revenue Service data, authorsʼ calculations.
a. Income is measured in constant 2000 dollars.
Figure 8. Shares of the Increase in Real Income Going to the Top Decile and to the
Top 1 Percent, Selected Intervals, 1966–2001
aIan Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 113
prevents quantiﬁcation of the actual dollars of real labor income earned by
various strata within the top 10 percent of the distribution, or of increased
skewness within the top 10 percent, which the IRS data allow.
48
A convenient way to dramatize the role of increasing skewness at the
top is to decompose the two different factors that caused fully 45.0 percent
of real labor income growth from 1966 to 2001 to be earned by the top 10
percent, in sharp contrast to the 27.3 percent share in 1966. How much of
this difference between 45 and 27 percent was caused by an upward move-
ment of income above the 90th percentile relative to that in the lower per-
centiles, and how much was caused by increased skewness within the top
10 percent? To answer this question, we calculate the income of each
group within the top 10 percent on the counterfactual assumption that each
group’s ratio to the income of the 90th percentile (P95/P90, P99/P90, and
so forth) was ﬁxed at the 1966 ratio. It is obvious from the bottom panel of
ﬁgure 7 that the income level of each group above the 90th percentile
would have been lower under this counterfactual, and indeed our calcula-
tion indicates that the top 10 percent would have captured 36 percent of the
real income gain over 1966–2001 instead of the actual 45 percent. Thus we
conclude that exactly half of the extra income gain of the top 10 percent
above its original 1966 income share of 27 percent was due to increased
income for the top 10 percent relative to the lower percentiles, and the rest
to increased skewness within the top 10 percent. This second factor repre-
sents a ﬁnding that the CPS data are incapable of addressing.
Another, less widely known fact is that, as reported above, although the
top of the income distribution takes most of the nonlabor income, the share
of income at the 95th percentile and above that comes from nonwage
sources has declined over the years, while the share for all other groups
has increased.49
48. Gottschalk and Danziger’s ﬁndings (2005, ﬁgure 16, p. 252) show enormous sensi-
tivity to CPS measures of inequality to the method of top coding. Their P90/P10 ratio in
2002, using a base of 1979 = 100, is roughly 140 with “unadjusted top coding” and 118
with “Burkhauser top coding.”
49. Our results are complementary to those of Kopczuk and Saez (2004), whose ﬁgure 9
shows that the increase in the share of total income for the top 0.01 percent over the period
1976–2000 consists almost entirely of salary and professional income rather than income
from capital and capital gains. Comparing 2000 with 1929, the share of the top 0.01 percent
was similar, at 3.5 percent, but a much larger share in 1929 took the form of capital income
and a much smaller share the form of salaries and professional income.Together our results thus resolve the puzzle raised at the outset: Why
has growth in median real wages and real incomes lagged so far behind
productivity growth when labor’s share of total income has been relatively
stationary? Our answer is that labor’s share includes the wage and salary
income of the top 10 percent, who have garnered exactly half the gains
over 1966–2001. The stability of labor’s share disguises a large gain in the
share of that share that is going to the top 10 percent and a decline in the
share going to everyone else, including the median earner.
Causes of the Increase of Income Inequality
Our ﬁndings naturally raise questions about the interpretation of these
dramatic shifts in the distribution of income that have caused median real
income gains to lag so far behind productivity growth. We start with the
question of whether income mobility is sufﬁcient to mitigate the effects of
rising inequality. If everyone’s relative income were in constant motion,
allowing each person to visit each percentile of the distribution over some
span of time, there would be no cause for concern, because the cast of
characters in the top 10 percent or the top 0.1 percent would be constantly
changing. Next we turn to controversies in the recent literature on the
causes of increased inequality and suggest a different mix of causes than
has been identiﬁed in recent papers.
Income Mobility
Doubts can be raised about the signiﬁcance of any ﬁndings regarding
income inequality that are based on a cross section of individuals who
occupy different places in the income distribution from one year to the next.
For one thing, income obviously depends on age, with low incomes typical
during youth, higher incomes in the prime earning ages, followed by little
or no labor income in retirement. An MBA student, for example, might
report wage and salary income from a summer internship of $5,000 in one
tax year but report income of $120,000 ten years later. Wage and salary
incomes of taxpaying units ﬂuctuate from year to year for many other rea-
sons, including unemployment, movement in and out of the labor force in
response to childbirth or illness, and ﬂuctuations in sales commissions and
bonuses in response to changes in national, local, or individual economic
circumstances. Fluctuations in nonlabor income are even more likely.
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005How much do such factors cause our analysis above to overstate the
increase in lifetime inequality? Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto cite a
useful analogy from Joseph Schumpeter of a hotel where the quality of the
rooms improves the higher the ﬂoor.
50 Is our society one in which many
people over their lifetimes occupy both basement and penthouse rooms, or
is it a mostly immobile society in which some remain stuck in the base-
ment all their lives while others luxuriate permanently in the penthouse?
Evidence provided by Katherine Bradbury and Jane Katz shows clearly
that there was substantial income mobility across income quintiles over
decade-long periods in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
51 It would be surpris-
ing if this were not true, given the simple life-cycle factors cited above.
People like the MBA student in our example account for many of those
who started in the basement (the bottom 20 percent) in one year and
wound up in the penthouse (the top 20 percent) just ten years later, but
this basement-to-penthouse transition occurred over a full decade for only
3.3 percent of basement dwellers in 1969, 3.2 percent in 1979, and 4.3 per-
cent in 1989. Stories like an executive’s retirement, or his or her Enron- or
WorldCom-like transition from the penthouse to jail, account for 5.0, 4.2,
and 3.0 percent of penthouse dwellers in 1969, 1979, and 1989, respec-
tively. Overall, the Bradbury-Katz evidence shows no increase in income
mobility alongside the increase in income inequality, and indeed there were
small increases in the proportion of penthouse dwellers who remained in
the penthouse a decade later: from 49.1 percent in 1969, to 50.9 percent in
1979, and 53.2 percent in 1989.
In short, income mobility due to life-cycle and other reasons is a con-
stant feature of any economy. No one is the median taxpayer or wage
earner forever. The important fact about income mobility is that it takes
place independently of the quite new phenomenon of increased skewness
of the distribution of labor in the 1980s and 1990s. Not only are half of the
penthouse dwellers still there a decade later, but the opulence in the pent-
house keeps increasing relative to conditions in the basement.
Causes of Increased Income Inequality
An enormous outpouring of literature has examined the increase in
wage inequality since the 1960s. Here we cite several key contributions
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50. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, p. 73).
51. Bradbury and Katz (2002).and raise some questions. We divide our discussion into three parts. The
ﬁrst covers the recent literature on general explanations, the most com-
mon of which is “skill-biased technical change” (SBTC), that attempt to
explain the increase in such ratios as P90/P10 or P90/P50. The second
concerns certain special factors operating mainly at the bottom of the
income distribution. The third concerns the top of the distribution. In our
view the observed changes in the income distribution reﬂect multiple
causes, some of them independent of each other, and we reject the ten-
dency of some analysts to argue for a particular single cause.
THE SBTC HYPOTHESIS. The SBTC hypothesis emerges from a simple
model in which two skill classes of labor are imperfect substitutes.52 The
skilled-unskilled wage differential depends on what happens to the relative
supply of the two groups of labor and on changes in the demand for skills.
Often the average wages of college relative to high school graduates are
used as a proxy for the skilled-unskilled differential. Because the relative
quantity of college graduates has increased, particularly in the 1970s, the
SBTC proponents argue that the rising skilled-unskilled wage differential
must reﬂect a shift in employer demand toward more-skilled workers.
A prominent survey by Card and DiNardo criticizes the SBTC
approach on several grounds.53 Assuming that the dominant technical
change over the past few decades has involved computers, Card and
DiNardo argue that the timing is wrong. In their data all of the increase
in inequality occurs during 1980–86, whereas computer technology has
been developing more or less steadily over the decades, perhaps with an
acceleration in the “new economy” period of the late 1990s. They also
point out that the timing is wrong in relation to aggregate productivity
growth, which as we have seen was slow in the 1979–97 period when
inequality increased most and revived in the mid-1990s after most of the
increase of inequality had already happened. Card and DiNardo much
prefer an alternative explanation, namely, the decline in the real mini-
mum wage: they find an almost perfect negative correlation between
this and the increase in the P90/P10 income ratio, most of these move-
ments being concentrated in the 1980–86 period.
Paul Beaudry and David Green also question the SBTC hypothesis,
viewing it as an idea whose time has come and gone.54 They estimate,
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52. See, for instance, Katz and Murphy (1992).
53. Card and DiNardo (2002).
54. Beaudry and Green (2002).using data for 1971–87, an SBTC equation that explains the skilled
wage differential by a relative supply term and a time trend to represent
technological change, and then compute the predicted value for 1988–
2000. The predicted value wildly overpredicts the actual differential by
about 0.35 in logs.
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES. Autor, Katz, and Kearney offer a more
complex, multicausal interpretation. First, they support a limited role for
SBTC, taking the view that the change in the college–high school wage
differential is well explained by a steady, demand-driven growth in the
relative demand for college graduates overlaid with ﬂuctuations in the rel-
ative supply of college graduates. Second, in their CPS data, as in ﬁgure 6
above, the increase in P90/P10 wage inequality is relatively steady over
the 1980s and 1990s rather than concentrated only in the early 1980s
when most of the drop in the real minimum wage occurred.
However, like Beaudry and Green, Autor, Katz, and Kearney also crit-
icize a purely SBTC explanation on the ground that the increase in
inequality began to plateau around 1992, whereas the new economy
revival of aggregate productivity growth began around 1995. Thus they
echo the skepticism of Card and DiNardo. Second, they emphasize the
difference in magnitude between the P50/P10 inequality changes, which
were negligible (as shown in figure 7 above), and the P90/P50 changes,
which were substantial and continuous. They argue for a more articu-
lated conception of SBTC that distinguishes among five types of job
tasks, ranging from “routine manual” at the bottom to “nonroutine ana-
lytic” and “nonroutine interactive” at the top. Using occupational data,
they assign different shares of these job tasks to each decile of the 
wage distribution and conclude that demand growth has sharply shifted
toward those tasks most common in the upper three income deciles; they
view this as evidence in favor of a “polarization hypothesis.” However,
their broad definitions of these job tasks cover substantial shares of 
the population and so do not explain increased skewness within the top
10 percent.
If SBTC had been a major source of the rise in inequality, we should
have observed an increase in the relative wages of those most directly
skilled in the development and use of computers. Yet during 1979–97
fully half of the growth in the college-noncollege wage premium can be
attributed to the increased relative wage of the occupational group
called “managers,” and only 17 percent to the occupational groups presum-
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 117ably favored by SBTC (including “engineers” and “math/computer”).55
Here Europe may provide some perspective, because the increase in the
ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay so evident in the United States
has not occurred there. We return below to the puzzle of rising CEO pay
premia.
Inequality at the Bottom: The “Great Compression” and Its Causes
A signiﬁcant limitation of most of the SBTC literature is that it consid-
ers only the period since about 1970 and ignores the preceding ﬁfty years.
Yet the basic facts to be explained about income equality are not one but
two: not only why inequality rose after the mid-1970s but also why it
declined from 1929 to the mid-1970s.56 Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo
have called the flattening of the income distribution during 1930–70 the
“Great Compression,”
57 and they attribute it to at least three events that ﬁt
neatly into this U-shaped pattern, all of which inﬂuence the effective labor
supply curve and the bargaining power of labor: the rise and fall of union-
ization, the decline and recovery of immigration, and the decline and
recovery in the importance of international trade and the share of imports.
Union membership ﬁrst rose and then declined in part because government
legislation encouraged its rise in the 1930s and increasingly discouraged it
in the postwar years. In addition, the invention of air conditioning facili-
tated the dispersion of employment into the Old Confederacy with its
“right to work” laws. Unions were further weakened by the steady decline
in the share of employment in manufacturing and mining, given unions’
failure to organize most employees in the services sector.
Partly as a result of restrictive legislation in the 1920s, but also as a
result of the Great Depression and World War II, annual immigration as a
fraction of total population declined from 1.3 percent in 1914 to 0.02 per-
cent in 1933. Immigration then remained very low until a gradual recovery
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55. See Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (2001, table 2.45, p. 200).
56. The most vivid representation of the U-shaped historical pattern of income inequal-
ity is Kopczuk and Saez (2004, ﬁgure 9), which shows the income share of the top 0.01 per-
cent and its composition across labor and capital income. This share fell from 3.7 percent
in 1929 to 0.6 percent in 1976 and then rose to 3.6 percent in 2000. The reason that their
3.6 percent is so much higher than our ﬁgure of 1.8 percent for 2001 in table 7 is that the
Kopczuk-Saez shares for the top 0.01 percent include capital income and capital gains
income, whereas table 7 reports only wage and salary income.
57. Goldin and Margo (1992).began in the late 1960s, reaching 0.48 percent (legal and illegal immigra-
tion combined) in 2002.
58 Competition for unskilled labor arrives not only
in the form of immigrants but also in the form of imports, and the decline
of the import share from the 1920s to the 1950s and its subsequent recov-
ery are basic facts of the national accounts.
Although Card and DiNardo and Autor, Katz, and Kearney raise
important questions about the SBTC hypothesis, we note two others.
First, inequality decreased as much from the 1920s to the 1970s as it has
increased from the 1970s to now. Are we to believe that technical change
over 1920–70 was “unskilled biased”? It is possible that the heyday of
unionized, assembly-line manufacturing provided an abundance of repet-
itive jobs for high-school dropouts, but the fact that these jobs paid rela-
tively well depended perhaps more on the strength of unions and the
relative absence of immigration and imports. Second, the SBTC hypoth-
esis fails to explain the absence of an increase of income inequality in
Europe despite the free flow of technology across borders.
59
Skewness at the Top: The Superstar Phenomenon
Our analysis of the IRS data suggests that most of the shift in the
income distribution has been from the bottom 90 percent to the top 5 per-
cent, and especially to the top 1 percent. This is much too narrow a group
to be consistent with a widespread beneﬁt from SBTC. We argue in this
section that two possibly independent phenomena are taking place at the
top of the income distribution. The ﬁrst is the increasing income premia
being paid to “superstars,” the subject of a brilliant analysis by the late
Sherwin Rosen almost a quarter-century ago.60 Rosen explains why a lim-
ited number of top performers in particular ﬁelds earn most of the income,
and we extend his ideas to explain why the superstar premium has been
increasing. We also take an explicit look at the incomes of two classes of
superstars, “power celebrities” and major league athletes. A second
group who earn a larger share of income at the top are CEOs and other
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58. Annual immigration as a share of the U.S. population is shown in Gordon (2003,
ﬁgure 5, p. 268).
59. For the latest data on the change in inequality in the United States versus the Euro-
pean countries, see Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, chapter 7). For an attempt to
develop theories of how European institutions distort the path of technical change, see Ace-
moglu (2002).
60. Rosen (1981).top corporate officers. Recent economic research provides the beginning
of an analysis of CEO premia while leaving some important questions
unanswered.
Rosen explains the extreme skewness in occupational categories domi-
nated by superstars by particular characteristics of demand and supply. On
the demand side, both market size and price per unit (the “ticket price”)
multiply together to form a revenue function whose convexity implies
that “small differences in talent become magniﬁed in large earnings dif-
ferences, with great magniﬁcation if the earnings-talent gradient increases
sharply near the top of the scale.”61 Competition remains present but does
not work to drive down these differentials: “hearing a succession of
mediocre singers does not add up to a single outstanding performance.”
On the supply side, the performer exerts the same effort whether 10 or
10,000 witness the performance.
Superstars beneﬁt from skewness, but why has the degree of skewness
increased? As Rosen recognizes, a succession of innovations going back
to the phonograph, radio, and motion pictures has increased the size of
audiences who can hear a given performance, thus increasing the incomes
of superstars by many multiples. Thus superstars represent a particular
type of SBTC that is concentrated at the very top of the income distribution,
where the technological change in question is the development of com-
pact discs, cable television, and other forms of “audience magniﬁcation.”
As Rosen shows, superstars represent an equilibrium phenomenon: there
is no suggestion that markets do not work, and technological change feeds
directly into increased premia.
A typical reaction to our use of the superstar model to explain increased
skewness at the top is, “But there aren’t enough superstars.” This raises the
question, How many superstarsare there among the 13,000 IRS tax returns in
the 99.99th percentile, which in 2001 accounted for $83 billion of income,
with an entry threshold of $3.2 million? Here we report on the incomes
of a small set of entertainment superstars and a larger group of profes-
sional athletes. But this is only the tip of the iceberg of the superstar phe-
nomenon. Rosen himself cites examples of other entertainment superstars
(comedians, classical musicians) as well as economics textbook authors,
some other authors, and lawyers, and he quotes approvingly from Mar-
shall’s  Principles, which mentions high-earning barristers, jockeys,
painters, and musicians.
120 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
61. Rosen (1981, p. 846).An annual Forbes feature on the “The Celebrity 100” reports estimated
2004 incomes for 100 top celebrities, including superstars in the worlds of
movies, music, TV, multimedia, sports, and ﬁction writing.
62 The reported
incomes range from $290 million for ﬁlmmaker George Lucas to a mere
$1.5 million for child star Amanda Bynes. The total income accounted for
is $3.1 billion, for an average annual income of $31 million, with a
median income of $25 million. All but 3 of the top 100 have incomes that
qualify them for the IRS 99.99th percentile. Yet this is an underestimate
of the top 100 superstar incomes, because the celebrity list is chosen
based not just on income but also on indicators of fame, including num-
bers of magazine covers, media citations, and Internet hits.
Although the top-100 celebrity list leaves unknown the total incomes
of other superstars in the entertainment world, we can perform a complete
census of major league baseball, football, and basketball players using
data maintained by USA Today.
63 The 2005 total payroll for these 2,820
athletes was $7.0 billion, for an average of $2.48 million per player, a bit
short of the entry level to the IRS 99.99th percentile. Here our main inter-
est is in the contribution of these athletic salaries to the overall increase in
skewness, and unfortunately only the baseball data source provides infor-
mation going back more than ﬁve years. For the twenty-six major league
baseball teams that have existed since 1988, total payroll has increased
from $295 million to $2 billion, and the average salary has increased from
$354,000 to $2,075,287. The inﬂation-adjusted increase was 8.9 percent a
year, compared with a 6.0 percent annual rate of real increase for the IRS
top 99.99th percentile between 1987 and 2001.
Together the incomes of these 100 celebrity superstars and roughly
3,000 athletes account for $10 billion in 2004–05, still well short of the
$83 billion in the IRS 99.99th percentile in 2001. But this excludes other
sports, such as golf and tennis, which Rosen speciﬁcally mentions as ben-
eﬁciaries of media expansion, and it excludes high-earning entertainment
ﬁgures below the level of the 100 celebrities. Finally, this tally excludes
such celebrity lawyers as the late Johnny Cochran and David Boies and
top-earning ﬁgures in such professions as management consulting and
investment banking, for example Jack Meyer, who earned $25 million
annually to manage the Harvard endowment.
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63. See asp.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/default.aspx for baseball and the cor-
responding sites for football and basketball.CEOs and Other Top Executives
Clearly a large share of the income at the very top of the income distri-
bution is earned by CEOs and other top corporate ofﬁcers. But we treat the
increasing pay premia of CEOs as different from the superstar phenome-
non, in light of the puzzles that arise in its economic analysis. Here we cite
other sources that document the increase in CEO pay relative to average
pay, quantify total CEO compensation in a large sample of U.S. ﬁrms, and
discuss alternative explanations of the increased CEO premia that doubt-
less contribute to the increased skewness at the top of the U.S. income dis-
tribution.
The ratio of average CEO pay to average worker pay increased from 27
in 1973 to 300 in 2000, then fell to 237 in 2001 as a result of the stock mar-
ket crash.
64 Including both cash and equity compensation, the 1989–2000
increase in CEO compensation was 342 percent, which compares with
5.8 percent for the median hourly wage. A basic difﬁculty for any equilib-
rium theory to explain this jump in CEO premia is that it is primarily a
phenomenon of the United States and has not happened elsewhere. The
ratio of average CEO pay to the average compensation of manufacturing
production workers in 2003 was 44.0 in the United States, more than dou-
ble the ratio of 19.9 in thirteen other rich countries.
65
Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein provide valuable data and analy-
sis of the CEO pay phenomenon.
66 They report average pay for the top
ﬁve executives in 1,500 ﬁrms: those in the S&P 500, the Mid Cap 400,
and the Small Cap 600 indexes. Average pay in 2001 was $14.3 million
for the CEOs and $31.9 million for the top ﬁve executives, or $6.4 million
each. This is 7,500 people making $6.4 million each, more than half of the
13,000 people in the IRS 99.99th percentile, who, coincidentally, made an
average of $6.4 million each in 2001. Our ﬁrst inference is that most of
these executives are in the IRS 99.99th percentile and that their total
income of $48 billion accounts for more than half of income in that quan-
tile in 2001.
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64. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005, ﬁgure 2Y, p. 214). Other facts in this and
the next paragraph come from the same source, pp. 212–16.
65. The discrepancy between the ratio of 44 for the cross-country comparisons and the
ratio of 237 just above for the United States is explained in Mishel, Bernstein, and Alle-
gretto (2005, p. 216) as due to inconsistent data sources.
66. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005).Does rising CEO pay reﬂect a reward for increasing ﬁrm size, rate of
return, or growth in rate of return? Bebchuk and Grinstein analyze data
from 14,154 ﬁrms and show that the compensation of the top ﬁve execu-
tives increased during 1993–2003 by 76 percent more than their regres-
sions of compensation on these explanatory factors can explain. They
calculate that the ratio of top-ﬁve compensation to total proﬁts for a large
sample of about 20,000 ﬁrms rose from 5.0 percent in 1993–95 to 12.8 per-
cent in 2000–02.
What Bebchuk and Grinstein call the “arm’s-length bargaining per-
spective” explains increased CEO pay by demand and supply factors,
where demand depends on the value to corporations of executive services,
and supply depends on alternatives for CEOs in other occupations and the
nonpecuniary aspects of the job (stress, legal risk, and so forth). Bebchuk
and Grinstein emerge unconvinced by this model, arguing that the stock
market boom of the 1990s should have increased CEO premia only tem-
porarily, not permanently, and that incomes in alternative occupations
have increased much more slowly than for CEOs. They also reject the
view that corporate compensation committees were ignorant of the fact
that stock options imposed costs on shareholders.
Their alternative, “managerial power” perspective veers further from
equilibrium economics. In this view directors do not seek to get the best
deal for shareholders. The only constraint on CEOs paying themselves
unlimited amounts is the “outrage constraint,” which weakened in the
1990s as rising stock markets paciﬁed shareholders. This approach comes
close to being observationally equivalent to saying that CEO pay depends
on stock market valuation, although Bebchuk and Grinstein’s own regres-
sions suggest that CEO pay has far outpaced such valuations. These
regressions would be consistent with an inﬂuence of stock market prices if
CEO pay is correlated with stock prices while still outpacing them.
Although their paper is inconclusive about the merits of an “arm’s-
length bargaining model” versus a “managerial power model,” we propose
a variant of the latter called the “scratch-my-back model,” which posits an
exclusive class of CEOs who determine each other’s pay subject to rela-
tively few market constraints. This image is conveyed by the following
newspaper account:
The compensation committee talks to an outside consultant who has surveys
that you could drive a truck through and pay anything you want to pay. . . . The
outside consultant talks to the HR [human resources] vice president, who talks
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 12367. Gretchen Morgenstern, “How to Slow Runaway Executive Pay,” The New York
Times (business section), October 23, 2005, p. 1.
68. The Economist, “Where’s the Stick?” October 11, 2003, p. 13.
to the CEO. The CEO says what he’d like to receive. It gets to the HR person
who tells the outside consultant. And it pretty well works out that the CEO gets
what he’s implied he thinks he deserves, so he will be respected by his peers.67
The Economist christens this phenomenon the “Lake Wobegon effect,”
after Garrison Keillor’s mythical Midwestern town where “all the children
are above average.” No corporate compensation committee wants to pay
the average; rather they all want to pay above average, and “so bosses’ pay
spirals upwards.”
68
The basic data reviewed here and the controls applied in the Bebchuk-
Grinstein regressions suggest that top executive compensation has spi-
raled up at about the same rate as the compensation of baseball players.
Together the well-understood phenomenon of superstars and the puzzling
case of CEOs clearly explain most of the large increase of compensation
in the 99.99th percentile relative to the 90th. A broader interpretation of
technology that includes new media inventions seems crucial in explain-
ing the rising skewness of superstar income, whereas some role for stock
market valuations may help to explain the CEO puzzle, including the dif-
ference between the United States and Europe in CEO pay.
Conclusion and Further Research Agenda
This paper started as a detective story in search of the missing produc-
tivity payoff. The macro part of our investigation conducted a detailed
search to locate the effects of the post-1995 productivity revival, with a
parallel search for the effects of the post-1965 productivity growth slow-
down. The micro part of our research used IRS data to shed light inside the
top 99.9th and 99.99th percentiles and linked increased skewness at the top
both to the economics of superstars and to the less well understood phe-
nomenon of escalating CEO pay premia.
The Surprising Micro Conclusion
A basic tenet of economic science is that productivity is the seed that
creates the ﬂower of a nation’s standard of living. But our results raise
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005doubts. Our most surprising result from the large IRS micro data set is that,
over the entire period 1966–2001, only the top 10 percent of the income
distribution enjoyed a growth rate of total real income (excluding capital
gains) equal to or above the average rate of economy-wide productivity
growth. The bottom 90 percent of the income distribution fell behind or
even were left out of the productivity gains entirely.
Another way to state our main results is that the top 1 percent of the
income distribution accounted for 21.6 percent of real total income gains
during 1966–2001 and 21.3 percent during the productivity revival of
1997–2001. Still another way is that the top 5 percent of the income dis-
tribution earned more of the real 1997–2001 gain in wage and salary
income than the bottom 50 percent.
Our results show that the dominant share of real income gains accruing
to the top 10 percent and the top 1 percent is almost as large for labor
income as for total income. This contradicts those economists who believe
that growing inequality is entirely a matter of the dominant share of
wealth and capital income at the top; for instance, Philip Swagel of the
American Enterprise Institute recently stated, “It looks like the gains
from the recovery haven’t really filtered down. . . . The gains have gone
to owners of capital and not to workers.”
69 It is not that all the gains went
to capital and none to labor; rather, our finding is that most of the gains
in labor income, too, went to the very top percentiles.
Many previous papers have documented an increase in American
income inequality over the past three decades, but most have used CPS
data that, because of top coding, have nothing to say about shifts in the
income distribution within the top 10 percent of income earners. We docu-
ment that the top 10 percent of wage and salary earners reaped 45 percent
of real income gains during 1966–2001, compared with a 27 percent
income share in 1966. Of that 18-percentage-point difference, half is due
to an increase of incomes in the 90th percentile and above relative to those
below the 90th, whereas the other half is due to increased inequality within
the top 10 percent, and especially the gains of the top 0.1 percent compared
with the next 9.9 percent.
Our new data on the micro income distribution are accompanied by a
review and extension of a large literature in labor economics on inequal-
ity. We conclude that there has been virtually no increase in inequality at
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69. Quoted in Leonhardt, “U.S. Poverty Rate Was Up Last Year,” p. A14.the bottom as measured by changes in the P50/P10 ratio. The standard
explanation, skill-biased technical change, has some role in explaining
increased inequality in the group with incomes between the 50th and the
90th percentile, although the literature has raised legitimate questions
about the timing of the increase in skill premia and its relation, if any, to
the spread of computer technology and the timing of macro productivity
growth.
Because our IRS data allow a close look inside the top 10 percent right
up to the 99.99th percentile, we emphasize causes of increased inequality
at the very top. We combine two separate analyses, the first of the eco-
nomics of superstars, where technology has broadened audiences and
increased the rewards for the very best as compared to the next best, and
the second of CEOs, whose current compensation relative to average
wages has increased by a large multiple since the 1970s, as has superstar
income but perhaps for different reasons. For both analyses we collect
new data and cite other papers in concluding that superstars and CEOs
account for most of the income earned in the very top reaches of the
income distribution.
The New Macro Analysis
The macro analysis of this paper identiﬁes a previously overlooked
aspect of inﬂation and wage dynamics. The most important result is that
an acceleration or a deceleration of the productivity growth trend alters
the inﬂation rate by at least one for one in the opposite direction. This is
an impact of the change in the rate of trend productivity growth and dies
out if trend productivity growth stabilizes at a new level, as it did in
1995–2005. Symmetrically, the post-1965 acceleration of inﬂation was in
part caused by the infamous productivity slowdown of those years. Coun-
terfactual simulations of our econometric model suggest that the 1965–80
slowdown in productivity growth boosted inﬂation on average by about
1.3 percentage points during the 1965–80 simulation period, whereas
the 1995–2005 revival of productivity growth held down inﬂation on
average by about 1.2 percentage points over that period.
Linking the macro and the micro analysis, a deceleration of inflation
that accompanies a productivity growth revival is good news for wage
and salary earners generally. But it does not overturn or in any way con-
ﬂict with the story of this paper’s micro analysis of income distribution.
126 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005For a bottom-group wage earner with annual growth in real income after
1995 of 0.5 percent, that real income growth rate would have been −0.5 per-
cent without the productivity growth revival. For a top-group wage earner
with annual real income growth of 4.0 percent, the absence of the produc-
tivity growth revival would have reduced that growth to 3.0 percent. The
effect of faster trend productivity growth after 1995 in reducing the inﬂa-
tion rate was good news for the economy, contributing to improved macro-
economic stability and easing the task of monetary policy. But this
productivity-inﬂation nexus does not alter our main message that increased
skewness of the income distribution was responsible for the large diver-
gence between the growth rates of median and mean real wage and salary
income.
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Discussion
Daniel E. Sichel:
1 Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon have put together
a very nice paper that covers some important ground. Although I will
highlight some quibbles and questions, my overall view is that the paper
is quite interesting and extremely well crafted. The issue the authors exam-
ine could be summarized as “Who got the beneﬁts from the increases in
labor productivity, in the past decade and over the longer haul?” To address
this question, the paper covers four broad issues. First, it reviews the key
measurement issues that must be understood before proceeding to a com-
parison of trends in labor productivity and real compensation per hour.
Second, the paper tills some new ground on wage-price dynamics and
presents a new inflation equation, an updated version of Gordon’s
“Goldilocks” equation from several years ago. Third, the paper uses the
estimated wage-price dynamics to gauge the effect on the labor share of
income when trend productivity growth changes. Finally, the paper turns
to a micro analysis of changes in the income distribution, using Internal
Revenue Service tax data from 1966 to 2001; importantly, the paper links
these data to a measurement framework consistent with the National
Income and Product Accounts, allowing the authors to examine which
income deciles received gains in real hourly compensation that equaled or
exceeded the rate of increase in labor productivity growth, and which
received less. I will focus on each of these broad topics in turn.
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1. The views expressed are mine alone and should not be attributed to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve or other members of its staff.The ﬁrst point made in the paper’s measurement section is that compar-
isons of productivity growth and gains in real compensation per hour must
be made using comparable data. Some analysts compare productivity in
the nonfarm business (NFB) sector with average hourly earnings deﬂated
by the consumer price index and ﬁnd that productivity has risen signiﬁ-
cantly faster than real wages. As Dew-Becker and Gordon point out, how-
ever, such a comparison can be quite misleading, because the consumer
price index used to deﬂate average hourly earnings differs from the deﬂator
used for NFB productivity, and because the average hourly earnings mea-
sure covers the earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers only,
not all workers in the sector. Dew-Becker and Gordon steer readers to a
more appropriate earnings measure against which to measure changes in
labor productivity, namely, a comparably deflated measure of compensa-
tion per hour from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Productivity and Cost
(P&C) release. This measure does cover all workers in the sector, and by
this measure the difference between the growth rate of labor productivity
and that of real compensation per hour over the past several decades is
rather small.
Although the authors get to the right numbers for comparing labor pro-
ductivity and real hourly compensation, their explanation of why P&C
compensation per hour is more appropriate for this comparison than aver-
age hourly earnings is incomplete. They correctly point out the difference
in worker coverage, but they do not mention another very important dif-
ference, which is that average hourly earnings excludes beneﬁts whereas
P&C compensation per hour includes the value of beneﬁts. The value of
output used in the labor productivity ﬁgure includes beneﬁts, and it is
therefore important to use a compensation measure that also includes ben-
eﬁts, especially given that beneﬁts make up nearly 30 percent of compen-
sation and have risen considerably faster than wages and salaries in recent
decades.
2
The second point emphasized in the paper’s measurement section is the
well-known fact that the labor share of income has exhibited no discernible
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2. According to data from the Employment Cost Index (ECI), beneﬁts made up 29 per-
cent of total compensation in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005, and their value increased over the
period from 1979:4 to 2005:1 at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent, compared with 
3.3 percent for wages and salaries. The rate of increase in wages and salaries in the ECI is
quite close to that of average hourly earnings over the same period.trend over the past twenty years or, arguably, the past ﬁfty. Of course, this
share could have shifted over these periods if and only if aggregate labor
productivity and aggregate real hourly compensation had increased at dif-
ferent rates; thus the stylized fact about constant labor shares implies—and
is implied by—the similarity in growth rates of labor productivity and real
hourly compensation noted above. I have no quibble with any of this
analysis, which is based on the conventional NIPA data. However, this
widely accepted result is dependent on the use of those particular data. If
one deﬁned investment more broadly than do the NIPA data, a different
result about labor shares could emerge. Although this line of argument
may seem like a detour from the paper’s main story line, it actually could
be quite central to the issues raised in the paper.
In particular, the conventional NIPA data fail to capitalize most busi-
ness investments in intangible assets, but instead count the expense of
acquiring or developing these assets as an intermediate purchase.
3 Accord-
ing to two recent papers that I co-wrote with Carol Corrado and Charles
Hulten, business investment in intangible capital is about as large as that in
tangible capital; moreover, intangible investment has grown considerably
more rapidly in recent decades than has tangible business investment, and
the stock of intangible capital has grown considerably more rapidly than
has the stock of tangible business capital.
4 If these intangible assets are
counted as business investment, the share of capital income will show a
noticeable upward trend in recent decades, and the share of labor income
will show a marked downtrend.
5
This point has direct implications for the present paper. First, the rapid
growth of intangible capital raises questions about the widely accepted
stylized fact that the labor share of income has been relatively stable in
recent decades. Over periods when the economy is transitioning to a mode
of production that is more intensive in intangibles, the shares of labor and
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3. Computer software is the most notable exception; other intangible assets that are not
currently capitalized in the NIPA data include research and development, other product
development costs, investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, and investments in organi-
zational structure (such as Wal-Mart’s processes for managing its supply chain).
4. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005a, 2005b). Closely related work has been done by
Nakumura (2003); see also Brynjolfsson (2005) for a review of his work on intangibles.
5. Similarly, results in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005a, 2005b) imply that, once the
additional investments in intangibles are included, labor productivity has increased more
rapidly than real hourly compensation in recent decades.capital could be shifting, even if the NIPA-derived shares are not. Second,
to the extent that the returns to intangible capital have accrued to the
upper income quantiles (which seems likely, since these returns are likely
to accrue to the more educated), the presence of these additional assets
could be affecting the upper tiers of the income distribution. Of course, at
this point that is only speculation, and more work needs to be done to con-
ﬁrm whether this is so.
The second broad contribution of the Dew-Becker and Gordon paper is
the development of a new inﬂation equation. This equation updates Gor-
don’s “Goldilocks” inﬂation equation and is similar to it in many ways.
6
Both the new and the old equations include lagged dependent variables
entered as four-quarter moving averages for lags one, five, nine, thirteen,
seventeen, and twenty-one. Both also include the unemployment gap
(measured as the difference between the unemployment rate and a time-
varying NAIRU), a term for the relative price of food and energy, a term
for the relative price of imports, and terms to capture the Nixon-era price
controls. The new speciﬁcation differs from Goldilocks by including a
term for the relative price of medical services, as well as the ﬁrst and ﬁfth
lags of a variable capturing acceleration in labor productivity, measured
as the eight-quarter change in the growth of Hodrick-Prescott trend pro-
ductivity with a smoothing parameter of 6400. In the old equation the pro-
ductivity terms were entered as the current value and ﬁrst lag of the
deviation of productivity growth from trend.
As the authors demonstrate, the new equation generally passes tests for
parameter constancy and performs admirably in out-of-sample forecasting
tests.
7 But what should one make of this impressive performance? On the
one hand, identifying a single equation that is stable across all of the struc-
tural changes in the economy over the past forty years is a remarkable
achievement. On the other hand, there is always the risk that the speciﬁca-
tion just manages to thread the needle of the various speciﬁcation tests but
still is fragile. As is apparent from my description, the new speciﬁcation
has a rather intricate lag structure. Moreover, many practitioners of the
dark art of estimating inﬂation equations know that it is tricky to get a pro-
ductivity trend to enter an inﬂation equation signiﬁcantly. Relatively small
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6. Gordon (1998).
7. The one coefﬁcient that is not stable across the sample is that on the term for the rel-
ative price of food and energy.changes in the speciﬁcation can affect the signiﬁcance of the productivity
terms. Also, the equation includes a large complement of variables repre-
senting supply shocks. This choice seems reasonable enough, although it is
worth noting that the food, energy, and medical supply shocks in the equa-
tion account for about 25 percent of the weight in consumer prices. Push-
ing this approach to the limit (which Dew-Becker and Gordon do not), one
could keep adding still other supply-shock terms, such as a housing-cost
supply shock, and eventually get a perfect ﬁt once every component of
consumer prices has been included as a supply shock. Given my concern
about the potential fragility of the new inﬂation equation, I would want to
see additional sensitivity tests to be completely persuaded that this is a
robust speciﬁcation.
More broadly, even though the parameters of the new inﬂation speciﬁ-
cation are stable within its sample period of more than forty years, the
speciﬁcation itself has changed since the Goldilocks version of seven years
ago. Thus Gordon’s inﬂation speciﬁcations themselves have not been sta-
ble across time, even if at particular points in time he has succeeded in
developing equations that exhibit within-sample parameter stability. The
latest changes to the Gordon inﬂation equation capture the fact that inﬂa-
tion has been lower over the past ten or so years than the inflation equa-
tions of a decade ago might have led one to expect. Dew-Becker and
Gordon explain this lower-than-previously-expected inflation both by
adding the medical supply-shock term already mentioned and by tweaking
the way that trend productivity enters the equation. Others have explained
the lower-than-expected inﬂation through a smaller effect of slack on inﬂa-
tion (that is, a shallower Phillips curve), perhaps linked to a better anchor-
ing of inﬂation expectations. Although the stability of the new inﬂation
equation is impressive, I do not believe that this paper will win over those
who believe that the Phillips curve has become shallower over time.
The third broad area covered by the paper is the dynamics of wages,
prices, and productivity. The main contributions here are the development
of a wage equation that is combined with a slightly modiﬁed price equation
to create a system in which wages and prices are dynamically linked.
This system is then simulated to gauge how the slowdown in trend pro-
ductivity around the late 1960s and early 1970s and the speedup in the
mid-1990s affected inflation and the labor share of income. The results
here seem quite sensible to me, with the most striking ﬁnding being the
symmetry of the effects of these changes in trend productivity. According
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005to the authors’ simulations, the productivity slowdown of the late 1960s
and early 1970s boosted inﬂation by about 11⁄4 percentage points a year,
and the mid-1990s speedup held inﬂation down by about the same amount.
Similarly, the productivity slowdown is estimated to have raised the
change in the trend labor share of income by 0.2 percentage point a year,
whereas the mid-1990s speedup is estimated to have reduced this change
by about the same amount.
The ﬁnal part of the paper turns to micro evidence on the income dis-
tribution, using the IRS wage and salary data from 1966 to 2001. As the
authors note, other researchers have used these data to look at a similar set
of questions.
8 What is new here is the evaluation of gains in real hourly
compensation in different slices of the income distribution, relative to the
1.6 percent average annual increase in labor productivity over the same
period. The authors’ snazzy and quite provocative result is that only those
in the 90th percentile and above realized gains in real hourly compensa-
tion that matched the rate of productivity growth over the past forty years.
Although experts in the literature would undoubtedly ﬁnd several things
to quibble with in this analysis, I suspect that the paper’s broad qualitative
result would stand up to that sort of scrutiny.
Given that I am not one of those experts, I will make just a few points.
First, Dew-Becker and Gordon have data on wages and salaries for the
income groups they study, but they do not have data on beneﬁts. They use
the aggregate ratio of beneﬁts to compensation to translate their data on
wages and salaries into total compensation, thus assuming that beneﬁts
affect all quantiles proportionally. One way to evaluate this assumption is
with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ release on Employer Cost
for Employee Compensation (known as the ECEC). These data show,
by occupation, the breakdown of nominal compensation into wages and
salaries and the various components of beneﬁts. To roughly gauge whether
beneﬁts are proportional to overall compensation across income groups, I
selected the occupations that had the highest and the lowest overall com-
pensation in 2001 and compared the beneﬁts share of compensation across
these occupations.
The highest-paid occupation was “executive, administrative, and man-
agerial” and the lowest-paid was retail trade. In 2001 beneﬁts made up
nearly 28 percent of compensation for executives, but just over 20 percent
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8. For example, Piketty and Saez (2003).for workers in retail trade. Moreover, from 1986 to 2001 the beneﬁts share
of compensation rose for executives but fell for retail workers.
9 Thus, ben-
eﬁts do not appear to be proportional to income, and this unequal distribu-
tion of beneﬁts became more unequal from 1986 to 2001. Although these
data represent just an example rather than a comprehensive look at the
question, this simple comparison suggests that higher-paid workers had a
larger share of beneﬁts in their total compensation than did lower-paid
workers and that their share has been rising over time. This example raises
the possibility that the present authors’ results actually understate the
increase in income inequality.
Second, I approve of the fact that the authors avoid identifying a single
explanation for the increase in inequality at the very top of the distribution
and instead are open to a variety of explanations. I also like their approach
of blending explanations—noting, for example, that changes in technol-
ogy may have fueled both the rise of superstars and the decline in union-
ization. In addition, I thought it quite clever to track down the data on
“The Celebrity 100,” professional athletes, and CEOs.
Finally, although I like this part of the paper, it does not fully answer the
question of why the income distribution has changed in the way that it has.
For example, in their discussion of CEO pay, Dew-Becker and Gordon
advocate a variant of the standard managerial power explanation, which
they call the “scratch-my-back” model. However, they do not provide a
fully satisfying explanation of why the mutual scratching has become
more intense in recent decades or of how that explanation ﬁts the facts
about the distribution of high-end incomes earlier in the twentieth century.
For example, the authors’ story implicitly seems to rely on the idea that
weak corporate governance in recent years has allowed executives to
extract ever-larger compensation packages. However, a recent paper by
Carola Frydman and Raven Saks indicates that real gains in compensa-
tion for executives were smaller in the 1950s and 1960s, and it seems
hard to argue that corporate governance was stronger in that period than
it has been more recently.
10
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9. The comparisons start in 1986 because that is the earliest year for which the relevant
data are available.
10. Frydman and Saks (2005). Frydman and Saks develop a long and consistent data-
base of executive compensation. They also provide evidence that marginal tax rates affect
the relationship between stock market valuation and executive pay. In particular, Frydman To sum up, this paper makes several valuable contributions to the
debate over who has benefited most from recent productivity gains. The
conclusions are quite sobering and raise an interesting set of questions
about the linkages among labor productivity growth, compensation, and
well-being.
Robert Topel: According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the highest-
earning profession in the United States is—ready?—economics teachers.
Of course, this is as it should be. Economic forces have increased the
demand for the particular skills we teach, which has raised the price for our
services. Our wages have grown faster than aggregate productivity over
the past thirty years. My back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that
the real wage of starting assistant professors in top university departments
of economics roughly tripled between 1979 and 2000.
As its title suggests, this paper by Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon
seeks to understand who has gained from increased productivity in the
United States. It is motivated by three well-known facts about wage and
productivity growth and the distribution of income:
—Labor’s share of national income in the United States has been
remarkably stable in the long run, averaging about 70 percent. As a corol-
lary, long-run growth in both productivity and compensation per worker
has been roughly equal.
—Second, despite the correspondence between compensation and pro-
ductivity growth over long periods, labor’s share may fluctuate over
shorter periods. Periods of accelerated productivity growth, as occurred in
the late 1990s, may reduce labor’s share.
—Third, even over the long run—say, from 1970 to today—the distri-
bution of gains from productivity growth has been highly uneven. Although
the gains from rising productivity accrue to labor, by conventional mea-
sures the wage and salary income of the median worker has barely
increased, if at all. Only in the upper reaches of the wage distribution have
wages grown as much as productivity, reﬂecting a substantial increase in
wage inequality in the United States.
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and Saks’ empirical work indicates that increases in the stock market value of ﬁrms lead to
smaller increases in the real before-tax value of executive compensation when marginal tax
rates are higher than when they are lower.Dew-Becker and Gordon document and seek to explain these features
of the data, offering two distinct and (in my view) noncomplementary
analyses. The ﬁrst combines careful measurement of relevant series from
the NIPA data with a time-series econometric model of NIPA aggregates—
average wages, productivity, the price level, and so on. Beyond the niceties
of such models, which I shall leave to the cognoscenti, their contribution is
to explain short-term ﬂuctuations in labor’s share in response to changes in
productivity growth. I argue that the framework ignores some of the fun-
damental economic forces at work: the long-run stability of labor’s share,
combined with short-run changes in that share when productivity growth
changes, is implied by the structure of modern growth models.
The second is a detailed analysis of individual tax returns, based on
IRS data, that attempts to link macro-level productivity growth to the dis-
tribution of income. The point here is to document who gained from rising
productivity and to resolve the “puzzle” of rising average productivity but
stagnant median earnings. The resolution lies in the difference between an
average and a median. Although this is the correct answer, I argue that
this was not really a puzzle to knowledgeable observers of income distri-
bution. Along the way, Dew-Becker and Gordon offer a critique of the
“skill-biased technical change” (SBTC) explanation for rising inequality
in the United States, and their own interpretation of what the causes might
be. I did not ﬁnd this analysis compelling.
DETERMINANTS OF LABOR’S SHARE IN THE LONG AND THE SHORT
RUN. The “macro” section of the paper makes two contributions. The
first is a careful measurement exercise applied to the sources of national
income. I thought this was quite useful. The second is a time-series model
of wage and price dynamics, which then “determines” labor’s share. Key
to this is that the model has enough degrees of freedom that labor’s share
may rise or fall in response to a change in productivity growth, depending
on the temporal patterns with which w and p adjust. I have no quarrel with
the details of this exercise, but I have two critical comments about its
place in this paper. First, it is entirely disconnected from what I see as the
paper’s focus, which is to document the distribution of income gains from
recent productivity growth. The paper’s central message would not change
if this model were not in it. Second, it bears noting that observed patterns
of adjustment in income shares are consistent with certain economic fun-
damentals that the paper ignores. A macroeconomic model of inﬂation
and wage dynamics is not necessary to understand why labor’s share may
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will do the trick.
The observation that labor’s share is fairly constant in the long run is
one of the foundations of modern theories of economic growth, beginning
with Nicholas Kaldor’s observation that the capital-output ratio is constant
and Robert Solow’s contribution to growth accounting in the 1950s. Thus
Solow, Hirofumi Uzawa, and Robert Lucas,
1 among others, posit that
national output is produced with constant returns and labor-augmenting
technical progress:
Here A is the state of labor-augmenting technical progress. Then K/L
grows at the same rate as A, yielding constant income shares for labor and
capital. In this framework Paul Krugman’s comment that “the essential
arithmetic says that long-term growth in living standards . . . depends
almost entirely on productivity growth” is dead on.
2
In this framework, changes in labor’s share are determined by the elas-
ticities of supply of labor and capital and the elasticity of substitution
between them. Assume that labor is in ﬁxed supply, and denote the supply
elasticity of capital by η. Let σ be the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital. Labor’s share is the ratio of the marginal and average
products of labor, which responds to the change in productivity:
where sk is capital’s share. According to equation 2, wages will grow more
slowly than productivity if σ < 1 and the supply of capital is not perfectly
elastic. Both of these conditions describe the “short run”: the ease of substi-
tution between capital and labor surely rises with the length of the adjust-
ment period, and the evidence is that capital is in (very) elastic supply in the
long run. Thus standard models of economic growth, which are the foun-
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1. Solow (1956); Uzawa (1965); Lucas (1988).
2. Emphasis added. Krugman is one of four New York Times columnists quoted in the
paper.standards mentioned by the authors, will do the trick. Short-run changes in
labor’s share in response to changes in productivity are no mystery.
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND RISING INEQUALITY. The remainder of
the paper offers an accounting of income growth and its distribution, based
on IRS tax return data, and an interpretation of the data. The motivation for
this is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 above, which shows indices for labor produc-
tivity and weekly wages at the 95th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the dis-
tribution of wages of full-time, full-year male workers. The top line
represents productivity, which grew by about 60 percent between 1970 and
2000. The next line down is the wage of men at the 95th percentile, mea-
sured from the March Current Population Survey (CPS), which grew by
slightly over 40 percent, and so on. The relative wage indices clearly
illustrate the trend toward rising inequality in the United States. As impor-
tant for this paper, wages measured in the CPS grew more slowly than pro-
ductivity even for men at the 95th percentile of the wage distribution. Real
wages for the median male worker showed essentially no long-term
growth. These facts are well known.
There are basically two ways to reconcile the wage and productivity
data—to make things add up, as it were. First, total compensation (the rel-
evant concept for NIPA) may rise faster than wages because nonwage
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a. “Pn” refers to the nth percentile.beneﬁts—which are not counted in the CPS or, for the most part, in IRS
data—become a more important component of compensation. The second
is that the ﬁnancial gains from rising productivity have accrued to very
high earners, while the vast majority of wage earners have gained propor-
tionally less. There is some truth to both explanations: it is widely known
that beneﬁts are a rising portion of compensation, and rising inequality is
perhaps the most widely studied empirical fact in economics over the past
twenty years.
Although they acknowledge that nonwage compensation has grown
more rapidly, on average, than wages, Dew-Becker and Gordon dismiss
the importance of this fact for understanding the level and distribution of
gains from rising productivity. Indeed, they assume, without discernable
foundation, that relative growth of nonwage compensation affects all per-
centiles of the income distribution equally. Thus they “apply the decline in
the NIPA wage share of compensation equally to all percentiles,” which
means that compensation relatives are unaffected by their adjustment, and
that compensation growth for the median earner is not adjusted upward by
much. But that is not what happened. Much of nonwage compensation
comes in the form of a ﬁxed cost per employee—the rising cost of health
care benefits is a good example—that have a larger impact on the median
earner than on high earners. This issue was studied by Brooks Pierce,
3 who
used internal BLS data on the employment cost index (ECI) to estimate
the evolution of “compensation inequality.” Pierce ﬁnds that the fraction
of compensation taken as wages is lower at the 10th percentile than at the
50th, and higher at the 50th than at the 90th.
These ﬁndings reﬂect, in part, the income elasticity of demand for ben-
eﬁts. If the real incomes of very low wage workers have declined, as the
data clearly indicate, the ﬁrst thing to go may be beneﬁts, especially if the
costs of those beneﬁts have risen. Thus the fraction of low-wage workers
with employer-provided health insurance has fallen dramatically, reﬂect-
ing powerful substitution and income effects on demand. Pierce also esti-
mates that income elasticities decline monotonically with income. Overall,
the data indicate that compensation growth exceeded wage growth for the
middle half of the wage distribution, but not in the extremes. In the left
tail of the distribution, compensation grew more slowly than wages—
exacerbating inequality—while compensation and wages grew at roughly
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3. Pierce (1999).the same rate above the 80th percentile. Pierce’s data have little to say
about the extreme extremes of the wage distribution, but it is plausible that
wage and salary income is the whole story at the top, where the data suggest
that the income elasticity of demand for beneﬁts would be well below 1.0.
The upshot is that more of productivity growth found its way to the
typical worker than Dew-Becker and Gordon indicate—the connection
between “living standards” and productivity is not so tenuous as they
would have us believe, although Pierce’s findings are not so strong as to
negate the distributional issues studied here. Further, Pierce’s results on
the distribution of benefits reinforce the conclusion that the fortunes of
low-skill workers declined after 1973. Surprisingly, Dew-Becker and
Gordon deny the latter point. They state that relative wage inequality
below the median of the wage distribution has not changed over time, and
they cite a recent paper by Autor, Katz, and Kearney as reaching a similar
conclusion.
4 As is widely known, and indeed shown by Autor, Katz, and
Kearney, the wage differential, based on survey data, between the 50th
and the 10th percentile widened through the mid-1980s—the real wages
of low-skill workers were declining—after which it has been roughly sta-
ble. Inequality in the upper half of the distribution continued to rise.
The IRS data employed by Dew-Becker and Gordon are extremely
useful for demonstrating that rising inequality was itself skewed toward
the upper reaches of the wage distribution. In survey data like the CPS,
earnings responses are “top coded” to protect conﬁdentiality, and so the
data are not very informative about the earnings of workers above about
the 95th percentile. Although the IRS data have many disadvantages, they
are valuable because they record wage and salary income for individuals
earning, say, $10 million a year. Thus they provide detail on what has
happened at very high altitudes. In a nutshell, the authors ﬁnd that wage
and salary growth has been highly skewed toward the very top, conﬁrm-
ing the ﬁndings of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez,
5 who also used
IRS data.
Why did inequality rise? Why did the gains from rising productivity
ﬁnd their way mainly to the top of the wage distribution? Dew-Becker and
Gordon eschew an explanation based on their characterization of SBTC,
preferring a combination of “superstars” and CEOs engaged in something
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4. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005).
5. Piketty and Saez (2003).called the “scratch-my-back” model, where executives determine each
others’ pay.
SKILL-BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE. The marginal productivity theory
of income distribution puts some fairly severe restrictions on where one
might look for explanations of rising wage inequality. Consider just two
worker types, skilled (S) and unskilled (U). The ratio of their wages (Wj)
is determined by the ratio of the value of their marginal products:
Here Pj is a price index for goods made by skilled or unskilled labor, and
MPj is the marginal productivity of a worker of type j. So inequality will
increase if either the ratio of prices or the ratio of productivities rises. The
former can be affected by, say, increased trade with less developed coun-
tries, and the latter by changes in factor ratios (due to immigration, invest-
ment in human capital, and so on) or by technical progress that raises the
productivity of one group relative to the other. An example of the last
effect is SBTC, which Dew-Becker and Gordon describe as a “shift in . . .
demand toward more-skilled workers.”
To Dew-Becker and Gordon, however, SBTC is evidently a much nar-
rower concept identiﬁed with the increase in computing power and appli-
cations: “If SBTC had been a major source of the rise in inequality, we
should have observed an increase in the relative wages of those most
directly skilled in the development and use of computers.” This is wrong.
The effect of technical progress on the wage of a particular type of
worker—say, a programmer or a developer—depends on the elasticity of
demand for the product, on the elasticity of supply of individuals with the
requisite skills for the task, and on the amount of skills required. Even if
technical progress has simply raised the productivity of a given quantity of
computer jocks, the wage of computer jocks may easily fall.
6
Dew-Becker and Gordon also criticize SBTC because wage inequality
narrowed in the United States from the 1940s to 1970. “Are we to believe
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6. A simple example: Assume constant returns to scale in strawberry harvesting.
Assume that technical progress raises the productivity of strawberry pickers by 1 percent,
which will reduce the price of strawberries by 1 percent as well. Then the demand for
strawberry pickers will increase if the elasticity of demand for strawberries exceeds 1.0.Well, actually it could have been. And it is salient that inequality of mea-
sured skills declined over this period, as greater proportions of young peo-
ple graduated from high school and college, while agriculture declined as a
source of employment. This has a direct effect on inequality—there are
more workers with skills—as well as an indirect effect through factor pro-
portions and hence prices.
7 Exactly this type of phenomenon occurred in
the 1970s, when the labor supply effect of college-educated baby-boom
cohorts caused the college–high school wage ratio to decline, even as over-
all wage inequality was rising. The authors dismiss these effects: rising rel-
ative wages of less skilled workers “depended perhaps more on the
strength of unions, and the relative absence of immigration and imports.”
Although these may be important, the authors present not an iota of evi-
dence in support of this sentiment.
More-direct evidence of a role for SBTC comes from the relative
employment growth rates of industries with different skill intensities.
Dividing industries into quartiles by years of average schooling of the
workforce, Kevin M. Murphy and Finis Welch ﬁnd that these growth rates
are rank ordered: from 1970 to 1998 the most skill intensive industries saw
their employment grow the most and the most steadily—industries in the
top quartile expanded their employment by about 75 percent—while
employment in the least skill intensive industries steadily contracted.
8 Evi-
dently the demand for skilled people increased—as is reﬂected in the prices
they commanded in the labor market.
Dew-Becker and Gordon’s last critique of SBTC is that it “fails to
explain the absence of an increase in income inequality in Europe despite
the free ﬂow of technology across borders.” This “fact” is news to me.
From my own work in equality-obsessed Sweden, I know that wage and
income inequality increased there, as well as in many other European
countries.
9 For a broader perspective I consulted the data of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which calcu-
lates income inequality from household surveys in its member countries.
With the exception of the Netherlands, the OECD data show an increase
in income inequality, as measured by Gini coefﬁcients, in fourteen of ﬁf-
142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
7. See, for example, Topel (1997).
8. Murphy and Welch (2001).
9. Edin and Topel (1997); Fredrikson and Topel (2005).teen member countries between the mid-1980s and 2000.10 It is true that
inequality is higher in the United States than in other OECD countries,
and it is probably true that European labor market institutions have con-
strained the increase in observed wage inequality that would otherwise
have occurred, creating other social costs and distortions in the process.
But inequality in Europe has risen nevertheless.
From my reading of the evidence, SBTC still looks good as an (perhaps
not the) explanation for rising wage inequality. It is probably the most
important explanation, but rankings need not concern us. Having dis-
missed it altogether, however, and having oddly concluded that inequality
did not increase among low-wage workers, Dew-Becker and Gordon offer
two alternative explanations for widening earnings differentials among
very high earners. The ﬁrst is the phenomenon of superstars—the idea that
the output of a single individual can now reach more users than before.
The second is the scratch-my-back model of CEO pay.
FACTORS AFFECTING PAY AT THE TOP OF THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION. Con-
sider superstars, which the authors identify with professional athletes and
entertainers. Because of advances in communications technology, it is now
possible for many more users to enjoy the output of the “best” producer:
millions could watch Michael Jordan without going to a Chicago Bulls
game. This is surely an aspect of SBTC: the “span of inﬂuence”—to use
one of Sherwin Rosen’s favorite phrases—has been increased by techno-
logical change, raising the relative productivity of a talented few. To Dew-
Becker and Gordon this is an understandable “equilibrium” phenomenon
when the subjects are Michael Jordan, Oprah Winfrey, or (dare I say) the
writers of economics textbooks.
11 But those examples account for only a
small portion of the increase in income among the very rich. CEOs, it is
alleged, have grabbed most of the rest. And since the authors do not under-
stand why their earnings have increased, it must be bad.
One might ﬁrst quibble with the facts. Although it is true that a small
cadre of CEOs have experienced astonishing increases in pay, I think the
authors fail to establish that they account for a large portion of the
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10. Förster and d’Ercole (2005). See also Smeeding (2002).
11. The authors repeatedly cite pay differences between the United States and Europe.
For example, they note that CEOs in Europe and other countries earn less than in the United
States. They might have also noted that European athletes and entertainers earn less than
those in the United States.extreme tail of the distribution: more than half of earnings increases
above the 99.99th percentile, as they claim. They cite evidence that the
top ﬁve executives in 1,500 ﬁrms received average pay in 2001 of $6.4
million: “This is 7,500 people making $6.4 million each.” No, it isn’t. It is
7,500 people with an average income of $6.4 million, many of whom
would not qualify for the 99.99th percentile of the wage distribution.
12
This is precisely the distinction that motivated this paper, and it is misap-
plied here.
Much of the literature on CEO pay is of the widely used “y =β x + my
theory” variety. That is, failing to explain some phenomenon with simple
economics, all constraints are off. This paper is no exception. The scratch-
my-back model avers that CEOs support each others’ exorbitant pay
increases, and things just go wild. Ironically, the authors support this
notion by quoting at length yet another New York Times journalist who
happens to hold a similar view.
It is popular to conclude that top executives are overpaid, which must
mean that investors could get the same performance for a fraction of the
costs, but do not. Maybe. Other authors, such as Michael Jensen and Kevin
J. Murphy, have argued that CEOs are (or at least were) underpaid. Maybe.
So far as I can tell, nothing in this literature provides convincing evidence
either way. The scratch-my-back discussion does not advance the ball.
Against these arguments it must loom large that the expansion of pay
at the very top of the wage distribution is a magnification of what has
happened at lower altitudes, and a reflection of what has happened to
superstars. From 1970 to 2000 wage growth increased smoothly and
monotonically across percentiles of the wage distribution, from the bottom
up to the 95th percentile. Why did the earnings of college graduates rise
relative to those of high school graduates? I think we have a good idea.
Why did the earnings of those with advanced degrees rise relative to the
earnings of college graduates? I think we have a good idea. Why did the
earnings of economics teachers rise relative to those of workers in other
ﬁelds? I think we have a good idea. Why did the earnings of superstars rise
so much? I think we have a good idea. Why did the rich get richer? Why is
it something else?
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12. The Forbes survey of executive compensation reports the pay of the 800 highest-
compensated CEOs in the United States. The median total compensation is about $2.5 mil-
lion, which according to the authors is outside the 99.99th percentile.
13. Jensen and Murphy (1990).General discussion: Edmund Phelps was skeptical of the paper’s link
between U.S. productivity growth and labor’s share of income. The United
States is, after all, only part of the world economy, currently accounting for
about a quarter of gross world product. Developments abroad could help
account for variations in capital income, thus calling the tight linkage into
question. In the two main recent periods of rapid U.S. productivity growth,
productivity rose even more in some other parts of the world: in continental
Western Europe and Japan in the 1960s, and in Eastern Europe and China
in the 1990s. These developments affected world real interest rates and the
growth of income from wealth relative to the stock of U.S. business assets,
and so provide an alternative explanation for variations in the nonlabor com-
ponents of U.S. income.
Addressing Robert Topel’s discussion of the paper, Phelps noted that
many models of economic activity do not ﬁx the relative shares of income
to labor and capital in the way that the familiar Cobb-Douglas production
function does. Instead there can be several different factors of production
and business assets, such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc, trained employees, which can lead
to changes in labor’s share both in the short and in the long run. Richard
Cooper challenged the authors’ claim that, because income inequality has
not increased in Europe and some other countries, skill-biased technical
change lacks empirical support outside the United States. He pointed out
that Gini coefficients in Mexico, India, China, Russia, and some other
emerging economies all show an increase in inequality. Indeed, the world
Gini coefﬁcient has moved toward greater inequality because China and
India, with their huge populations, have also been growing more rapidly
than the rich economies.
Lawrence Mishel reasoned that what matters for wage inequality is not
whether technological change affects the need for skills but whether that
impact has accelerated: Has the expanded demand for skills grown faster
than their supply? He observed that the supply of skills and education has
grown rapidly: in the past thirty years the share of the workforce with a
college degree has doubled, while the share who are high school dropouts
has fallen to a third of what it was. James Duesenberry noted that particular
developments affecting incomes can be identiﬁed at both extremes of the
income distribution. Immigration and the decline of unions have held down
wages at the low end, while intense competition for high-quality profes-
sionals has lifted incomes at the very high end. Most of the increases at
the top involve occupations, such as medicine, law, ﬁnance, and corporate
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon 145management, that require more than a basic college education. And there has
been increased competition for people who are exceptionally successful.
On the supply side, the most highly rated professional schools have not
increased their output at the same rate as demand has grown, and so their
graduates command a higher income premium than they used to.
David Laibson suggested that some of the rise in U.S. inequality is driven
by a change over the past century in the way men and women choose mates.
Many of today’s young adults marry people who are similar intellectually
and have the same ambitions and motivations. This assortive matching not
only creates households in which both spouses are equally highly paid,
but also tends to produce offspring with more extreme attributes, not only
in terms of IQ but also in terms of motivation and training.
Responding to the discussion, Dew-Becker and Gordon pointed out
that the two discussants disagreed about the distributional pattern of
employee beneﬁts. Sichel had offered evidence that beneﬁts had risen at
the top and declined at the bottom, implying that the paper understated the
increase of inequality. In contrast, Topel had cited evidence indicating
that beneﬁts matter most in the middle of the distribution and less at either
tail and that, above the 80th percentile, beneﬁts and wages grew at
roughly the same rate, implying that the paper did not misstate the
increase in inequality for the top 20 percent by omitting separate data on
beneﬁts.
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